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The debate over databases protection has failed to identify and
discuss some of its most basic and preliminary assumptions,
accepting instead many of the historical aspects involved as
given. This Article therefore seeks to challenge these underlying
assumptions by providing a fresh look at the historical
dimension of the debate. One common argument regarding
database protection is that the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Feist v. Rural Publications Inc. brought about a dramatic change
in the legal landscape, displacing the then-accepted "sweat of
the brow" rationale for protecting rights in databases. This
Article's historical analysis therefore thoroughly examines the
treatment of works of facts in general and compilations in
particular and reveals the very complex and rich legal landscape
that preceded Feist. For one thing, it shows that the law's
prevailing approach has long been to support unfettered access
to facts and other materials considered indispensable for
academic and economic progress. This Article's historical
analysis also demonstrates that the law's treatment of databases
has not, in fact, relied solely on the "sweat of the brow"
doctrine, but rather on a much more complicated spectrum of
legal analysis. Indeed, throughout U.S. copyright history-from
the early eighteenth and nineteenth centuries through the days of
the Copyright Act of 1909 and the 1976 Copyright Act until the
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Feist decision-judicial justifications for copyright protection
have swung back and forth between investment of labor on the
one hand and creativity on the other In particular, this Article's
historical analysis shows that, contrary to popular thought, the
"sweat of the brow" doctrine had been in constant decline
under the 1976 Copyright Act even before the Court finally
repudiated it in Feist.
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INTRODUCTION
The 1990s brought significant developments in the fields of com-
puters, telecommunications, and information technology. These in turn
stimulated the creation of a new global market for electronic information
services and products, a market that is occupied substantially by electronic
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databases. The emergence of these new technological developments and
the global information market challenged many traditional branches of
the law, including intellectual property law. A particularly prominent part
of this debate is how the law should address the protection of electronic
databases.
The debate over database protection in the United States can be
traced back to the Supreme Court's seminal decision in Feist Publica-
tions, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.' In Feist, the Court found
white pages telephone directories to be non-copyrightable. The Court
held that the touchstone for copyright protection is creative originality,
and that this requirement is constitutionally mandated. The Court's deci-
sion also clarified that its holding "inevitably means that the copyright in
a factual compilation is thin. Notwithstanding a valid copyright, a subse-
quent compiler remains free to use the facts contained in another's
publication to aid in preparing a competing work, so long as the compet-
ing work does not feature the same selection and arrangement." 2 Feist
thus ended the tradition in some courts of providing copyright protection
based on the labor invested in creating the work. In other words, Feist
declared the death of the "sweat of the brow" and "industrious collec-
tion" doctrines.
The debate gained additional prominence due to a number of world-
wide initiatives that extended protection to databases and considered the
provision of a much more extensive legal protection for databases. Nota-
bly, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights ("TRIPs Agreement")3 introduced minimum standards regarding
copyright protection for databases, and the ongoing discussion in the
World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") considered the provi-
sion of significantly broader intellectual property rights in databases than
does the United States under Feist.4 Furthermore, the European Union's
Directive on the Legal Protection for Databases ("Database Directive"),
adopted in 1996, constituted the most comprehensive attempt to provide
protection to databases. It granted a 15-year, renewable, sui generis right
to prevent the extraction and utilization of raw data in a database, thus re-
sulting in de facto protection of the raw data itself. When compared to
these much more protective measures, the Supreme Court's decision in
Feist arguably creates a marked gap between European and American law
in how each protects databases and their contents.
1. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
2. Id. at 349.
3. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
4. Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property
in Respect of Databases, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996).
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The adoption of the Database Directive, especially the reciprocity
provision that conditions protection of non-EU databases upon
reciprocal provision of comparable protection in non-EU jurisdictions,
has sparked an ongoing debate over bills drafted in the U.S. Congress to
address the legal protection of databases . A variety of stakeholders in
databases, including commercial users, Internet companies, database
publishers, libraries, universities, science organizations, financial institu-
tions, and legal scholars, have joined in this debate, giving their different
perspectives on how the law should handle databases.
In particular, a number of legal scholars have voiced their opinions
on the important question of how Congress should react to both the Su-
preme Court's 1991 holding in Feist and the EU's subsequent enactment
of the Database Directive. Most of this scholarship, however, has simply
accepted the argument, advanced by some segments of the database in-
dustry and others, that Feist creates a problem, that this problem is
exacerbated by the EU's Database Directive (and especially by the Di-
rective's reciprocity requirement), and that this problem needs to be
solved.6 Much of the scholarly discussion has also been dedicated to
criticizing the United State's proposed bills because of the risks they
supposedly pose to the database industry in general and to specific
groups such as the scientific and educational communities in particular.7
5. The current U.S. bill for database protection is the Database and Collections of
Information Misappropriation Act, H.R. 3261, 108th Cong. (2003) (as passed by the House
Judiciary Comm., Jan. 21, 2004). This bill adopts a pure misappropriation approach, modeled
almost literally after the test formulated in National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105
E3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
6. See, e.g., Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act of 2003:
Joint Hearing on H.R. 3261 Before the Subcomm. On Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Con-
sumer Prot. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 27 (2003)
[hereinafter H.R. 3261 Hearing] (statement of David Carson, General Counsel, Copyright
Office of the U.S., Library of Cong.) ("[T]here was a gap in existing legal protection, which
could not be satisfactorily filled through the use of technology alone.... Without legislation
to fill the gap, publishers were likely to react to the lack of security by investing less in the
production of databases ... ").
7. See, e.g., THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA AND INFORMATION IN
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPoSIUM (Julie M. Esanu & Paul E Uhlir eds.,
2003); COMMITTEE ON ISSUES IN THE TRANSBORDER FLOW OF SCIENTIFIC DATA, U.S. NA-
TIONAL COMMITTEE FOR CODATA, & COMMISSION ON PHYSICAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICS,
AND APPLICATIONS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, BITS OF POWER: ISSUES IN GLOBAL AC-
CESS TO SCIENTIFIC DATA (1997); COMMISSION ON PHYSICAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICS, AND
APPLICATIONS & DIVISION ON ENGINEERING AND PHYSICAL SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN SCIEN-
TIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATABASES (1999); COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
IN THE EMERGING INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2000).
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The academic debate has, therefore, also focused on suggesting new and
improved forms of protection that Congress could enact.8
Despite the extensive academic and legislative discussion on the sub-
ject of legal protections for databases, the questionable bases for the
assumptions underlying the debate are routinely overlooked, reflecting
blind acceptance of their accuracy. One major issue that has been ig-
nored is the historical dimension of the debate. This Article provides a
historical analysis of the protection of databases under modern intellec-
tual property law. Specifically, it addresses the popular claim, often
raised by proponents of legislation advocating broader database owner-
ship rights, that the United States Supreme Court's 1991 decision in
Feist brought about a dramatic change in the legal landscape. According
to this argument, Feist disturbed the status quo and overturned legal pro-
tections based on the industrious collection doctrine, also known as the
"sweat of the brow" theory, which governed copyright law for two hun-
dred years. Under this long-standing doctrine, database producers had
reasonably believed that their databases were entitled to copyright pro7
tection. Advocates of legislative action providing broader database
ownership rights contend that the legal system flourished under the
sweat-of-brow regime, and that Congress should therefore "restore"
what the Feist decision changed.9
Opponents of such restrictive legislation, by contrast, argue that the
industrious collection doctrine was never the prevailing approach for the
protection of databases. They argue that the legal landscape prior to Feist
reflected an information policy that consistently supported unfettered
8. See Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of
Information after Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1992) (suggesting a fed-
eral anticopying statute with collective licensing); Justin Hughes, How Extra-Copyright
Protection of Databases Can Be Constitutional, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 159 (2002); J.H.
Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REv. 51
(1997) (suggesting a modified liability approach).
9. See H.R. 3261 Hearing, supra note 6, at 27 (statement of David Carson, General
Counsel, Copyright Office of the U.S. Library of Congress) (urging "restoration of the general
level of protection provided in the past under copyright 'sweat of the brow' theories"); Collec-
tions of Information Antipiracy Act: Hearing on H.R. 354 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 157 (1999) [hereinafter
H.R. 354 Hearing] (statement of Marilyn Winokur, Executive Vice President, Micromedex,
Inc. on behalf of the Coalition Against Database Piracy) (asking to maintain "the traditional
balance between the respective interests of the owners and users of informational products");
Collections of Information Antipiracy Act; Trade Dress Protection Act; and Continued Over-
sight of Internet Domain Name Protection: Hearing on H.R. 2652 and H.R 3163 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 128 (1998) [hereinafter H.R. 2652 and H.R. 3163 Hearing] (statement of Jane C. Gins-
burg, Columbia University School of Law) (seeking to "restore the status quo ante-Feist").
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access to factual information.' In their view, it would be a mistake to
overturn two hundred years of legal tradition by passing legislation that
suddenly restricts access to fact-based works.
A historical analysis of database protection from the inception of
U.S. copyright law until Feist reveals that at various times, however,
what was perceived to be the copyrightable element of a work ranged
along a continuum between creativity and originality at one end and in-
dustriousness and labor at the other. In other words, judicial thought in
the United States has swung back and forth like a pendulum, alternating
between a focus on investment of labor and a focus on creativity as the
proper basis for copyright. The following historical analysis clearly indi-
cates that the arguments on both sides of the debate over potential
legislative action are inaccurate, and that prior to Feist the legal land-
scape was very complex in its treatment of information-based works.
In order to assess these arguments, it is important to thoroughly ex-
amine the treatment of works of facts in general and compilations in
particular over time. Relying primarily on the seminal work of Professor
Jane C. Ginsburg," this Article begins with an overview of the emer-
gence of the industrious collection doctrine and concludes with an
examination of the legal landscape of the industrious collection doctrine
under the 1976 Copyright Act. This historical analysis clearly illustrates
the complex and rich legal landscape in the years preceding Feist and
points to a general uneasiness and confusion about the doctrine. More-
over, it shows that most courts in their decisions were preparing the
ground for an eventual repudiation of the doctrine. This analysis also
supports the argument that U.S. policy on fact-based intellectual prop-
erty has consistently fostered unrestricted access to the factual content
contained in these works. Such access is based on an appreciation that
unrestricted access is necessary to stimulate innovation in both the pub-
lic and private sectors, support the educational process, and "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.""
The historical evidence thus demonstrates that neither those who ad-
vocate strong legislative protection of databases nor those who oppose it
are entirely correct in their characterization of the last two hundred years
10. See H.R. 354 Hearing, supra note 9, at 127 (statement of James G. Neal, Dean,
University Libraries, John Hopkins University) ("H.R. 354 would overturn our 200 years of
information policy in this country which has consistently supported unfettered access to fac-
tual information."); H.R. 2652 and H.R. 3163 Hearing, supra note 9, at 151 (testimony of
Jonathan Band, Partner, Morrison & Foerster LLP, General Counsel of the Online Banking
Association) ("In fact, sweat of the brow was never the prevailing approach for the protection
of databases").
it. Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works
of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865 (1990).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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of copyright jurisprudence in the United States. Contrary to what the
proponents of protective legislation would claim, the industrious collec-
tion doctrine has not consistently been the governing legal regime in the
U.S. for the past two hundred years, particularly after passage of the
1976 Copyright Act. By the same token, the claims of the opponents of
such legislation are also incorrect since the industrious collection doc-
trine was, at least for a certain period of time, a significant, if not the
prevailing, doctrine governing copyright protection in this country. Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court's decision in Feist could not have worked
a sea change in copyright jurisprudence in either direction, but rather is
more accurately described as merely ending the movement of that juris-
prudence along the continuum between authorship based purely on labor
and authorship based purely on creativity, finding the latter approach as
the only possible basis for copyrightability.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIOUS COLLECTION DOCTRINE
In 1789, the Framers of the Constitution empowered Congress to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."'13 The Framers appear primarily to
have intended to promote learning, with secondary concerns of protect-
ing authors and providing them with incentives and expanding the range
of ideas and information within the public domain. 4 However, because
no extensive history of the Copyright and Patent Clause exists, difficul-
ties abound in determining exactly what types of works the Framers
intended copyright to cover. On its face, the Copyright Clause says noth-
ing about originality as a prerequisite for legal protection, however the
text of the Clause implies such a requirement. By granting exclusive
rights only to "authors," the clause implies that originality is the essence
of the right to protection. Moreover, the Clause's reference to "progress"
suggests that a work entitled to copyright protection must contain more
than merely trivial originality. Nevertheless, the terms of the Clause are
so general that it offers little help in determining the minimum original
contribution necessary to create a copyrightable work from facts and
data.
After the Constitution was ratified, Congress quickly enacted the
Copyright Act of 1790 to provide limited periods of protection for original
works of authorship such as books, maps, and charts. Under this statute,
13. Id.
14. L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright
Protection for aw Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REV. 719, 783 (1989).
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compilations were considered to be "books,"'5 and, indeed, compilations
constitute one of the oldest forms of authorship protected under U.S.
law, dating back to the eighteenth century. 6 As Professor Ginsburg
writes, the works at issue in early copyright disputes were most often
highly useful, informational works such as calendars, maps, law books,
and arithmetic and grammar primers.' 7 The overwhelming presence of
informational works reflects, in Professor Ginsburg's opinion, an impor-
tant legislative policy of encouraging fact-based works underlying
English and American law: the 1710 English Statute of Anne,' 8 United
States Constitution,' 9 and the 1790 United States federal copyright stat-
ute 0 all characterized copyright as a device to promote the advancement
of knowledge.2'
Professor Ginsburg also has identified the development of two dis-
crete bases on which the concept of authorship has been founded:
investment of labor and investment of individuality.22 She argues that
"[p]erhaps because of the predominance of informational subject matter,
the concept of authorship and the basis for copyright protection underly-
ing judicial decisions until the mid-nineteenth century seemed to focus
on the labor, rather than the inspiration, invested in the work."23 Professor
Ginsburg also examined the idea that later in the nineteenth century
"courts and commentators began to offer ... a different rationale for
copyright coverage," stating that these authorities viewed authorship as
not purely the product of labor, but rather as the "emanation of an au-
thor's personality."24 The author's subjective judgment in arranging data,
rather than her diligence in collecting it, was held to be the protectable
essence of the work. Thus, a work was protectable because it incorpo-
15. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, reprinted in COPYRIGHT EN-
ACTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1783-1906 at 32 (Thorvald Solberg ed., 1906) [hereinafter
Act of May 31, 1790].
16. See, e.g., Kilty v. Green, 4 H. & McH. 345 (Md. 1799).
17. See Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1873. See also Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two
Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TuL. L. REV. 991,
998-1005 (1990) (discussing political and social reasons for the dominance of informational
works in early United States copyright).
18. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books
in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned, 1710, 8
Anne, ch. 19, reprinted in HARRY RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE 109 (1956).
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (ratified 1789).
20. Act of May 31, 1790.
21. Ginsburg, supra note 1l, at 1873.
22. id. at 1873-93.
23. Id. at 1873-74.
24. Id. at 1874.
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rated something of its creator's unique individuality;" the benchmark of
a work's value was the originality of its conception or execution, not the
author's investment of labor.26
Nonetheless, this conclusion does not suggest that courts required
that the work possess high levels of the requisite "subjectivity" or "dis-
tinctiveness '. 27  "Sufficient original authorship" could be found
"because each author is a distinct individual and inevitably stamps
some part of herself upon the work. 28 Moreover, as Professor Ginsburg
remarked, "this shift in copyright philosophy toward a more subjective
view of authorship" did not in fact suddenly "spur abandonment of the
prior labor-oriented approach. Instead, the two views continued to coex-
ist. 2 9 Consequently, throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth
century, the concept of original authorship embraced investment of both
labor and originality.
A. Labor as a Basis for Authorship
As Professor Ginsburg has explained, many English and American
copyright decisions in the eighteenth and early to mid nineteenth centu-
ries characterized copyrightable authorship in terms of the labor invested
in the work.3° This analysis was adopted by the Lord Chancellor in the
1806 decision Matthewson v. Stockdale, in which the court held that the
plaintiff's East India calendar was a protectable work:
[I]f a man, from his situation having access to the repositories in
the India House, has by considerable expence and labour procured
with correctness all the names and appointments on the Indian Es-
tablishment, he has a copyright in that individual work; which has
25. Id. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903)
(Holmes, J.); Jeffreys v. Boosey, 4 H.L.C. 815, 866-81, 10 Eng. Rep. 681, 702-07 (1854)
(Erle, L.J.).
26. Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1874.
27. Id.
28. Id. See also Jeffreys, 4 H.L.C. at 869; Jewelers' Circular Publ'g Co. v. Keystone
Publ'g Co., 274 E 932, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (Hand, J.) ("[N]o photograph, however simple,
can be unaffected by the personal influence of the author, and no two will be absolutely
alike"), aff'd, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922).
29. Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1873-74. See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine
Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951) ("All that is needed ... is that the 'author' con-
tributed something more than a 'merely trivial' variation, something recognizably 'his own.'
Originality in this context 'means little more than a prohibition on actual copying.' No matter
how poor artistically the 'author's' addition, it is enough if it be his own.") (citations omitted).
Cf L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc) (holding a copyright
on plastic bank copied from cast iron version invalid because this trivial variation did not
satisfy originality requirement).
30. See Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1873-74.
31. 12 Ves. Jun. 270, 33 Eng. Rep. 103 (Ch. 1806).
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cost him considerable expence and labour; and employed him at a
loss in other respects; though there can be no copyright in an In-
dia calendar, generally.
32
Furthermore, in the famous 1866 English decision Kelly v. Morris,33
the first English case involving a directory, the court held that where the
publication in question was a general directory, the only legitimate use
that a subsequent compiler could make of the already published, copy-
righted directory was to verify the results of his own independent efforts
to assemble the same information. Vice Chancellor Wood explained:
In the case of a dictionary, map, guide-book, or directory, when
there are certain common objects of information which must, if
described correctly, be described in the same words, a subse-
quent compiler is bound to set about doing for himself that
which the first compiler has done. In case of a road-book, he
must count the milestones for himself. In the case of a map of a
newly discovered island .... he must go through the whole proc-
ess of triangulation, just as if he had never seen any former map,
and generally, he is not entitled to take one word of the informa-
tion previously published, without independently working out
the matter for himself, so as to arrive at the same result from the
same common sources of information, and the only use that he
can legitimately make of a previous publication is to verify his
own calculations and results when obtained .... 34
In the United States, Justice Story followed the English precedent
and wrote in his 1845 Circuit Court decision, Emerson v. Davies:
35
A man has a right to the copy-right of a map of a state or coun-
try, which he has surveyed or caused to be compiled from
existing materials, at his own expense, or skill, or labor, or
money. Another man may publish another map of the same state
or country, by using the like means or materials, and the like
32. Id. at 105-06. Accord Lewis v. Fullarton, 2 Beav. 6, 8, 48 Eng. Rep. 1080 (Rolls Ct.
1839) ("[W]hilst all are entitled to resort to common sources of information, none are entitled
to save themselves trouble and expense by availing themselves, for their own profit, of other
men's works still subject to copyright and entitled to protection.").
33. L.R. I Eq. 697 (1866).
34. Id. at 701; accord Morris v. Ashbee, L.R. 7 Eq. 34, 40 (1868). Subsequent English
decisions adopted the rule laid down in Kelly v. Morris. See, e.g., Hogg v. Scott, L.R. 18 Eq.
444, 458 (1874); Morris v. Wright, L.R. 5 Ch. App. 279 (1870); Pike v. Nicholas, L.R. 5 Ch.
App. 251 (1869); Cox v. Land & Water Journal Co., L.R. 9 Eq. 324 (1869); Scott v. Stanford,
L.R. 3 Eq. 718 (1867). See also Ager v. Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co., 26 Ch.
D. 637, 642 (1884).
35. 8 F. Cas. 615 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436).
Trends in Production for Informational Works
skill, labor and expense. But then he has no right to publish a
map taken substantially and designedly from the map of the
other person, without any such exercise of skill, or labor, or ex-
36pense.
And in List Public Co. v. Keller,7 in which the court granted an in-
junction against the proprietor and publisher of a rival "society"
directory, the court adopted a pure "industrious collection" approach:
[T]he subsequent compiler must investigate for himself from the
original sources of information which are open to all. It has been
said that, in the case of a road-book, he must count the mile-
stones for himself, and in the case of a map of a newly-discovered
island he must go through the whole process of triangulation, just
as if he has never seen any former map; and generally, he is not
entitled to take one word of the information previously pub-
lished without independently working out the matter for himself,
and the only use he can legitimately make of a previous publica-
tion is to verify his own calculations and results when
obtained.... [I]t is safe to say that the compiler of a general di-
rectory is not at liberty to copy any part, however small, of a
previous directory, to save himself the trouble of collecting the
38materials from original sources ....
Likewise, in the famous 1905 decision, Sampson & Murdock Co. v.
Seaver-Radford Co., on the alleged infringement of a copyright of a gen-
eral alphabetical directory of the City of Boston, the First Circuit Court
of Appeals held that, "[whilst] all are entitled access to common sources
of information, none are entitled to save themselves trouble and expense
by availing themselves, for their own profit, of men's works still subject
to copyright and entitled to protection. '39 The court considered the eco-
nomic implications of copying, holding that:
Certainly the injury which such republications inflict on the
owners of copyrighted directories, and the undermining of the
markets of the original publishers arising therefrom, if permit-
ted, may be so serious that it is impossible to assume that the use
36. Id. at 619. See also Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1875 ("These sorts of statements led
contemporary writers of secondary sources to equate original authorship with industrious-
ness").
37. 30 F. 772 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887).
38. Id. at 772-73. See also Hartford Printing Co. v. Hartford Directory & Publ'g Co.,
146 F. 332, 334 (C.C.D. Conn. 1906) ("You must not bodily transmit the results of another's
labor from his sheets to your own; but, having made an honest canvass, you may use his work
for the purpose of checking and revising your own... ).
39. 140 F 539, 542 (1st Cir. 1905) (quoting Lewis v. Fullarton, 2 Beav. 6, 8 (1839)).
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to which the respondent put the complainant's publication, in the
manner we have expressed, is within any implied consent....'0
As Professor Ginsburg shows, when "[c]ombined with the United
States constitutional and legislative goals to 'promote the Progress of
Science' and learning, the labor concept of copyrightability appears to
furnish ample rationale for protecting all kinds of informational works,
from narratives to catalogues."4'1 Inquiry into the personal or subjective
character of the author's investment in his work seemed to have been
irrelevant.
2
A regime of exclusive ownership rights in information itself seems to
have been consistent with the early principles of copyright protection in
the United States. Professor Ginsburg argues, however, that such a con-
clusion is somewhat misleading. Even during that period of
jurisprudence, a copyright did not necessarily grant such expansive
rights.43 Indeed, the scope of early copyright protection in informational
works was narrow; although it extended to the precise contribution of the
first author,' it generally did not prevent competitors from duplicating
the actual information in the copyrighted work as long as they them-
selves acquired that same information directly from the primary sources
40. Sampson & Murdock Co., 140 F. at 543-44.
41. Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1876.
42. See Act of May 31, 1790, at 32 (reflecting this principle by providing protection for
any "map, chart, book or books," the first two categories of which are rather information-laden
and labor-intensive works).
43. Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1876-77.
44. Id. at 1877-81. See, e.g., English Cases: Cary v. Kearsley, 4 Esp. 168, 170-71, 170
Eng. Rep. 679 (K.B. 1802) (Lord Ellenborough). This decision, concerning a road atlas, cap-
tured some of the interests at stake in the issue of copyright scope:
[W]hen, in the defendant's book there are additional observations ... while I shall
think myself bound to secure every man in the enjoyment of copy-right, one must
not put manacles upon science. I think great part of the book that I have seen, Mr.
Kearsley might fairly avow that he had taken it from Mr. Cary's book. I shall ad-
dress these observations to the jury, leaving them to say, whether what so taken or
supposed to be transmitted from the plaintiff's book was fairly done with a view of
compiling a useful book, for the benefit of the public, upon which there has been a
totally new arrangement of such matter, or taken colourable, merely with a view to
steal the copyright of the plaintiff?.
Id. at 680. As for U.S. law, see, e.g., Webb v. Powers, 29 F Cas. 511 (C.C.D. Mass. 1847) (No.
17,323), which emphasizes the labor-valuing limitations on the scope of protection. In this
case, involving a dictionary of flowers, the court inquired if a second comer's appropriations
from the first author were "characterized by enough [that is] new or improved, to indicate new
toil and talent, and new property and rights in the last compiler." In this court's formulation,
"new toil and talent" give rise to "new property and rights," even when the toiler expends his
labor on a predecessor's efforts. Id. at 517.
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and not from copying the copyrighted work.45 In other words, a copyright
prohibited the actual act of copying but did not prohibit a second-comer
from compiling the same information independently. In this way, copy-
right protection under early court decisions operated in much the same
manner as the unfair competition tort of misappropriation currently op-
erates.4 6 Although a copyright did not prohibit the unauthorized re-
manipulation of data, under certain circumstances a copyright holder
could wield her copyright as a shield against second-comers who sought
to save themselves the effort required to gather information on their
47own.
B. Individuality as a Basis for Authorship
While the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Anglo-
American courts tended to view original authorship as a function of la-
bor, authors tended to characterize their work as an expression of their
personality. ' For example, the English writer George Colman declared
in 1775: "The wild field of nature gives a scope for that variety, which
ever distinguishes an area of genius. Never was there a period, wherein
excellent authors flourished, but their several manners were as different
as their faces ... *,49 Only later did the courts also finally begin to recog-
nize individual author personality as a basis for copyright protection." In
an 1854 House of Lords decision, one Lord proclaimed:
The order of each man's words is as singular as his countenance,
and although if two authors composed originally with the same
order of words, each would have a property therein, still the
45. See Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1876-81. See, e.g., Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Ves. Jun. 215,
222, 32 Eng. Rep. 336, 339 (Ch. 1803) (discussing a related idea that so long as the work was
sufficiently new, similar works to those already in existence could be published. "It is equally
competent to any other person, perceiving the success of such a work, to set about a similar
work, bonafide on his own. But it must be in substance a new and original work... ").
46. Ginsburg, supra note t1, at 1876-81. The classic misappropriation decision is In-
ternational News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) [hereinafter INS], in which
the Supreme Court announced a federal common law "quasi-property" right against misap-
propriation of commercial value. Id. at 239-40. See also Douglas G. Baird, Common Law
Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U.
Cmi. L. REV. 411 (1983).
47. See also List Pub. Co. v. Keller, 30 F 772, 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1887).
48. Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1881.
49. "The Gentleman" No. 6 (1775), in 1 PROSE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS (1787).
50. See Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1882-84 (tracing the development of this theory in
courts and focusing on several respected justices in particular).
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probability of such an occurrence is less than that there should
be two countenances that could not be discriminated.5'
While neither the United States Constitution nor the copyright laws
prior to 1976 expressly required originality, American courts in the later
half of the nineteenth century began to infer such a requirement from
the Constitution's textual reference to granting protection to "authors."
Because the term "author" means "beginner," "first mover," ".creator" or
"originator,"52 the Constitution's grant of protection to "authors"
necessarily requires originality; if a work lacks originality, it is not the
creation of an "author."53 As Judge Learned Hand stated, the Copyright
Clause's "grants of power to Congress comprise, not only what was then
known, but what the ingenuity of men should devise thereafter."
54
Eventually, the U.S. Supreme Court also inferred from the Copyright
Clause a requirement that a work be original in order to be copyrighted,
noting that the Framers of the Constitution understood "the nature of
copyright and the objects to which it was commonly applied, for copy-
right, as the exclusive right of a man to the production of his own genius
or intellect, existed in England at that time."55 Ultimately, the case law
eliminated any doubt that the prevailing prerequisite for copyright pro-
tection, regardless of the type of work at issue, is originality. 6 As the
following discussion shows, however, the case law also applied a more
specific threshold standard below which originality will not be found.
In the seminal case Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, the
plaintiff sued the defendant for reproducing a photograph of Oscar Wilde
51. Jeffreys v. Boosey, 4 H.L.C. 815, 869, 10 Eng. Rep. 681, 703 (1854) (Erie, L.J.)
(discussing copyright as a form of property).
52. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 11 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (The constitu-
tional definition of "author" is "'he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one
who completes a work of science or literature' "); see also 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.06[A] (2004) ("[T]he one indispensable element of
authorship is originality. One who has slavishly or mechanically copied from others may not
claim to be an author."); But see William F. Patry, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Reply,
6 COM. & L. 11, 18 (1984) (quoting I NIMMER & NIMMER, supra, § 2.01[A]) ("It was rea-
soned that since an author is 'the beginner ... or first mover of anything, ... creator,
originator,' it follows that a work is not the product of an author unless the work is original.").
Patty points out, however, that this reasoning is wrong because "it begs the central question of
defining originality in works that admittedly are comprised of elements of which the 'author'
was not the creator or originator," i.e., compilations of fact. Id. Indeed, the term "author" is
used loosely to include the broad spectrum of compilers or arrangers of factual data, some of
whom actually produce nothing original.
53. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 2.01.
54. Reiss v. Nat'l Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. 717, 719 (S.D.N.Y 1921).
55. Burrow-Giles, Ill U.S. at 58.
56. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 489-90 (2d Cir. 1976); 1 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 52, § 2.01.
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taken by the plaintiff. 7 The defendant admitted to copying the photo-
graph, but contended that the photograph was merely the "reproduction
on paper of the exact features of some natural object, or of some person"
and therefore was not a "writing" that could be considered copyrightable
subject matter.58 The United States Supreme Court rejected this argu-
ment.
Initially, the Court justified a more expansive construction of the
term "writings" by noting that the first federal copyright statute pro-
tected maps, charts and books, none of which are literally "writings.!'"'
Because those who drafted this first copyright statute were the same au-
thors who drafted the Constitution, the Court concluded that the Framers
of the Constitution must have intended a broader and less literal defini-
tion of the term "writings* '' The Court therefore interpreted the term
"authors" in the Copyright Clause to include anyone "to whom anything
owed its origin," such that the term "writings ... meant the literary pro-
ductions of those authors, and Congress very properly has declared these
to include all forms of writing, printing, engraving, etching, etc., by
which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible expression. 6'
Accordingly, the original photographer qualified as an "author" who
could be protected under the Copyright Clause.
Having established the broad constitutional scope of copyrightable
subject matter, the Burrow-Giles Court then proceeded to consider and
ultimately reject the defendant's contention that the plaintiff's photo-
graph was merely a reproduction of preexisting objects and thus could
not owe its origin to the plaintiff. Although this argument could plausibly
apply to "the ordinary production of a photograph,t'62 the Court explained
that the plaintiff's photograph was unique because it was entirely the
product of his own original mental conception, to which the plaintiff
"gave visible form" by selecting Wilde's pose, costume and other acces-
sories, and carefully using light and shadow to arrive at the "desired
expression." 63 It was only from such original conception, arrangement,
and orchestration that the plaintiff could have produced the picture. 
6
1
Consequently, the plaintiff's photograph was worthy of copyright protec-
tion and the Court allowed him to assert a copyright."
57. 111 U.S. at 53.
58. Id. at 56.
59. Id. at 56-57.
60. Id. at 57.
61. Id. at 58.
62. Id. at 59.
63. Id. at 55.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 60-61.
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Burrow-Giles imparts two important lessons. First, in order to be
copyrightable, a given subject matter must owe its origin to a particular
identifiable author. 6 Accordingly, things that are already in existence at
the time of alleged authorship cannot be copyrighted because no one can
claim the credit for their creation. Second, the Court held that despite the
general rule that pre-existing objects do not satisfy the "origination by
the author" requirement, a particular selection and arrangement of such
pre-existing items can qualify as copyrightable subject matter if that se-
lection or arrangement is the author's original conception."
Once the Burrow-Giles Court established "originality" as a prerequi-
site for copyright protection, lower courts were required to distinguish
original from unoriginal works, which they did by defining original
works as works that display some artistic merit.68 Such decisions were
perfectly consistent with the Burrow-Giles' Court's language. As the
Burrow-Giles Court noted, the "ordinary production of a photograph" by
itself would not have been copyrightable, suggesting that genuinely crea-
tive works are distinct from merely "ordinary" works. 9 Of course, this
approach would also leave many works unprotected simply because the
judge or jury was unable to appreciate their artistic merit.
Nineteen years after Burrow-Giles, the Court substantially, but not
completely, withdrew its requirement of artistic merit as a prerequisite
for copyright. In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes wrote an opinion rejecting artistic merit as a prerequi-
site for copyright, and also adopted a "copyright-as-personality"
approach.70 In Bleistein, a circus owner sued the defendant for copying
posters advertising the plaintiff's circus.7' Although this would likely be
an open and shut case under modem copyright law, both the trial court
and the court of appeals at that time rejected the plaintiff's claim on the
ground that advertisements could not possess the requisite artistic merit
to be copyrightable subject matter.12 The Supreme Court reversed and
specifically stated that the Copyright Act did not exclude works simply
because they were not considered to be "fine art"; "ordinary" works
66. Id. at 58.
67. Id. at 59.
68. See, e.g., J.L. Mott Iron Works v. Clow, 82 F. 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1897) (stating that a
writing is uncopyrightable unless it has "some value as a composition, at least to the extent of
serving some purpose other than as a mere advertisement or designation of the subject to
which it is attached"); see also Falk v. Donaldson, 57 F. 32, 34 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893).
69. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59.
70. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
71. Id. at 248.
72. Id. See also Courier Lithographing Co. v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 104 E 993
(6th Cir. 1900).
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could enjoy full protection as well. 3 Justice Holmes explained that the
source of an author's protection under copyright law lies in the author's
investment of unique individuality into his work. Copyrightable original-
ity thus requires only some minimal level of unique expression by the
author, some irreducible quantum that most people cannot define, but
which they can nevertheless recognize when they see it:
[A work] is the personal reaction of an individual upon nature.
Personality always contains something unique. It expresses its
singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art
has in it something irreducible, which is one man's alone. That
something he may copyright unless there is a restriction in the
words of the act.74
While this description distills the concept of originality down to a mini-
mum threshold standard,75 Holmes's opinion seems to rest more broadly
on the idea that the author's personality is key. In doing so, he may have
identified a practical truth-namely, true originality emanates only from
within a person, and by definition outside sources alone cannot give rise
to originality.
76
Holmes' interpretation also built upon another early Supreme Court
interpretation of originality. In United States v. Steffens, 7  one of the
Trade-Mark Cases, the Court concluded that the Trade-Mark Act was
unconstitutional because trademarks come into being only through ex-S78
tended periods of use, not from spontaneous creativity or design.
Because the establishment of a trademark relies only on the "priority of
appropriation" and displays "no fancy or imagination, no genius, no la-
borious thought," trademarks do not meet the originality requirement of
the Copyright Clause and are therefore not protectable under it.79 Thus,
in Steffens, as in Bleistein, a key criterion for copyright protection is the
individual author's personality or creative thoughts as embodied in his
73. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 2.01[B] (the Bleistein doctrine
provides that any "distinguishable variation" from a prior work is sufficient originality for
copyright protection "if such variation is the product of the author's independent efforts, and is
more than merely trivial"); see also Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99
(2d Cir. 1951); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession,
51 OIO ST. L.J. 517, 522, 537 (1990).
76. The dictionary definition of originality supports this proposition: "relating to or
constituting an origin or beginning ... not secondary, derivative, or imitative .. independent
and creative in thought or action"; "the power of independent thought or constructive imagina-
tion." WEBSTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 803 (1979).
77. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
78. Id. at 94.
79. Id.
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work. A trademark, however, is merely a symbol, albeit a unique one,
used for practical reasons-i.e., marking the product for sale-and,
therefore, is not a product of originality or creativity.
The Supreme Court offered yet further insight into what constitutes
originality in Baker v. Selden.'o Denying copyright protection to a book
providing an arrangement and explanation of a bookkeeping system, the
Court noted that copyright is supposed to be "for the encouragement of
learning," not merely for the "encouragement of industry or labor un-
connected to the advancement of learning and the sciences..'. The Court
also emphasized that originality does not require novelty, but rather only
independent creation: the "novelty of the art or thing described or ex-
plained has nothing to do with the validity of the copyright. 82 Moreover,
material drawn from the public domain will support a copyright if put
together as a "distinguishable" or "substantial" variation of preexisting
material.83 Thus, the Court did not require that the author create some-
thing never done before. Instead, creativity required some expression or
product that was the result of more than mere labor."4 "All that is needed
to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the 'author' con-
tributed something more than a 'merely trivial' variation, something
recognizably 'his own.'" Together Bleistein and Burrow-Giles consti-
tute the law that still governs copyrightable subject matter today,
establishing that only a modest quantum of originality is required for
copyright protection. Interestingly, these standards have generally not
been considered controversial.
As for the scope of protection under the "copyright as personality"
approach, former Justice Kaplan has suggested that the introduction of the
80. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). See also BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPY-
RIGHT 64 (1967) (discussing Baker v. Selden). In his book, Professor Kaplan summarized the
dilemma reflected in the Baker opinion and its resolution:
It is pointed out that the man who originated a workable system for producing and
marketing paperbacks was more deserving than the authors or publishers of many
sorry books put out in paperback which rest comfortably in copyright. Considering,
however, the difficulties in demarking the limits of such copyrights of methods and
the pervasive intrusion on competition which would be threatened, I daresay most
of us would prefer to stay with the Baker case.
Id.
81. Baker, 101 U.S. at 105.
82. Id. at 102. See also Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110
(9th Cir. 1970); Wihtol v. Wells, 231 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1956); Alfred Bell & Co. v.
Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951); Merritt Forbes Co. v. Newman Inv.
Sec. Inc., 604 E Supp. 943, 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
83. Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927).
84. Baker, 101 U.S. at 105.
85. Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 102-03 (citing Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d
512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945)).
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personality rationale led both to a greater disapproval of compositions
heavily dependent on predecessors' works and to an increasing intolerance
of copying in the nineteenth century.16 This development led to an expan-
sion in the scope of copyright protection over an increasing range of• •• 87
activities. Examination of the first hundred years of United States copy-
right laws from 1790 to 1891 reveals movement from "rights simply in
'printing, reprinting, publishing and vending' to the additional rights of
'completing, copying, executing, finishing, and vending ... and in the
case of a dramatic composition, of publicly performing ... [aind authors
may reserve the right to dramatize or to translate their own works.' ,88
II. THE INDUSTRIOUS COLLECTION DOCTRINE
A. The Emergence of the Industrious Collection Doctrine
Under the Copyright Act of 1909
It was only after the Copyright Act of 1909 ("1909 Act") was
enacted that the industrious collection doctrine truly made its first
appearance in American copyright jurisprudence. The 1909 Act allowed
putative authors to register their works for copyright protection. Under
section 5 of the Act, the application for such protection had to identify
their work from among certain specific categories. One of those
categories was "directories., 89 Although the 1909 Act did not say that all
categories of works listed in Section 5 were automatically copyrightable,
some courts nevertheless inferred that directories must be copyrightable
and that no further showing was required in order to benefit from
copyright protection.90 Thus was born the "industrious collection"
doctrine, otherwise known as the "sweat of the brow" doctrine in
American law.9'
86 Kaplan, supra note 80, at 22-25.
87. Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1885.
88. Id.
89. 1909 Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (previously codified at
17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216) (repealed 1976) [hereinafter the 1909 Act].
90. However, the legislative history of the 1909 Act might be interpreted as requiring
creativity:
As thus interpreted, the word 'writings' would to-day in popular parlance be more
nearly represented by the word 'works'; and this the bill adopts; referring back,
however, to the word 'writings' by way of safe anchorage, but regarding this as in-
cluding 'all forms of record in which the thought of an author may be recorded and
from which it may be read or reproduced.'
S. REP. No. 59-6187, at 4 (1907).
91. See supra Part I.A.
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The first expression of the industrious collection doctrine in Ameri-
can jurisprudence can be traced back to the 1921 Second Circuit
decision in Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing
Co., in which the court upheld the copyright of a trade directory contain-
ing various jewelers' addresses and trademark illustrations, which were
themselves unoriginal and non-copyrightable. 9 Stating that the "law is
now well established" regarding copyright protection of directories in
both England and the United States, 93 the court concluded that the right
to copyright a book does not depend on whether the collected materials
show literary skill or originality; rather, it depends on nothing "more
than industrious collection." 94 Thus, although the directory lacked origi-
nal thought and creativity, took no particular insight to produce, and
evidenced no original form, according to the court:
[T]he man who goes through the streets of a town and puts down
the names of each of the inhabitants, with their occupations and
street numbers, acquires material of which he is the author. He
produces by his labor a meritorious composition, in which he
may obtain a copyright, and thus obtain the exclusive right of
multiplying copies of his work.95
Accordingly, with this decision the court moved the concept of original-
ity, with its focus on individuality and the creative process, to the
background and placed renewed emphasis on labor and effort as a basis
for copyrighting compilations.
Furthermore, like its eighteenth and nineteenth century predecessors,
the industrious collection doctrine also extended copyright protection to
the original author's investment in collecting the facts contained in the
compilation, thereby providing protection that goes beyond simply the
original selection and arrangement the compiler contributed. In addition,
under the industrious collection doctrine, the only defense to infringe-
ment was independent creation. A subsequent compiler was "not entitled
to take one word of information previously published," but had to "inde-
pendently [work] out the matter for himself, so as to arrive at the same
result from the same common sources of information."
96
Although the doctrine therefore lacked justification under copyright
theory, it was serviceable when most compilation related copyright liti-
92. 281 F. 83 (2d Cir 1922). See also Donald v. Zack Meyer's TV Sales & Serv., 426
F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1970); Markham v. A.E. Borden Co., 206 F2d 199 (1st Cir. 1953) (copy-
ing portion of telephone directory to prepare separate directory constitutes infringement).
93. Jeweler's Circular Pub. Co., 281 E at 85.
94. Id. at 88.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 89.
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gation at that time dealt with old-fashioned databases such as telephone
directories. Later courts seized upon the doctrine to deal with situations
in which a compiler would make a substantial contribution of labor in
collecting factual data only to have someone else freely reap the bene-
fit.97 In applying copyright protection in this manner, courts were
probably trying to decrease the risk of a market failure or misappropria-
tion in situations in which people spent large amounts of time and money
compiling data. The abundance of cases that dealt with Jeweler's-type fac-
tual scenarios suggests that old-fashioned database piracy was probably a
significant problem in the pre-digital era. 98 As shown elsewhere, unlike
electronic database producers, old-fashioned database producers did not
have the same non-legal tools and features at their disposal to overcome
such a risk.99 All they could do was offer data and organize it in a manner
97. Professor Denicola argues that:
The effort of authorship can be effectively encouraged and rewarded only by link-
ing the existence and extent of protection to the total labor of production. To focus
on the superficial form of the final product to the exclusion of the effort expended
in collecting the data presented in the work is to ignore the central contribution of
the compiler.
Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfic-
tion Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 530 (1981). This argument fails to consider that
a work that does not meet the originality threshold is not entitled to protection regardless of
how much labor was imputed. The value of that labor can be protected by market forces be-
cause people will expend labor only on what others will purchase. The law can thus foster
efficiency by not granting unwarranted legal protection. See also Patry, supra note 52; Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Brennan reinforced this point in his Harper & Row dissent:
It is the labor of collecting, sifting, organizing, and reflecting that predominates in
the creation of works of history such as this one. The value this labor produces lies
primarily in the information and ideas revealed and not in the particular collocation
of words through which the information and ideas are expressed. Copyright thus
does not protect that which is often of most value in a work of history, and courts
must resist the tendency to reject the fair use defense on the basis of their feeling
that an author of history has been deprived of the full value of his or her labor.
Id. at 589.
98. See Symposium, Bioinformatics and Intellectual Property Law, April 27, 2001-
Boston, Massachusetts, Data Protection Statutes and Bioinformatics Databases, 8 B.U.J. Sci.
& TECH. L. 171, 172 (2002) (Professor Dennis Karjala, arguing that the reason for the exis-
tence of the sweat of the brow doctrine pre-Feist was probably market failure). See also Sarah
Lum, Note, Copyright Protection for Factual Compilations-Reviving the Misappropriation
Doctrine, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 933, 952 (1988) ("Courts applying the sweat-of-the-brow
standard of originality and courts enforcing the start-from-scratch rule of infringement implic-
itly rely on the misappropriation rationale because they emphasize the initial compiler's
investment of labor and protect it from piracy by subsequent compilers.").
99. Miriam Bitton, A New Outlook on the Economic Dimension of the Database Pro-
tection Debate, 47 IDEA 93 (2006)
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that best served users and hope that the courts would step in to protect
them when necessary.
1. The Prohibition on Exclusive Ownership in Facts and Fact-Based
Materials Under the Copyright Act of 1909 and the Emergence
of a New Emphasis on the Public Domain
Despite the swing of copyright jurisprudence back toward the in-
vestment of labor end of the copyright continuum after the 1909 Act, an
important, albeit often overlooked, piece in the historical puzzle is the
treatment of factual works under the 1909 Act and the emergence of a
new emphasis on the public domain. The prevailing approach under the
1909 Act, even in those courts adhering strictly to the industrious collec-
tion doctrine, was that facts and other indispensable materials are non-
copyrightable. Evidence of the prevalence of these values can be found
in copyright doctrines developed by the courts, most notably the
idea/expression dichotomy and its twin, the fact/expression dichotomy,
as well as the merger doctrine.
Furthermore, there was a growing awareness of and a new emphasis
on the importance of maintaining a broad public domain of fact-based
works. This analysis thus gives a broader perspective on the historical
argument that the industrious collection doctrine has always been the
ruling principle of copyright law in the United States and shows this as-
sumption is not entirely valid.
a. The Fact/Expression Dichotomy
The fact/expression dichotomy and its twin, the idea/expression di-
chotomy, are classic doctrines of copyright law.'0° They reflect the
balance that copyright law seeks to achieve between encouraging authors
to create new works by protecting their original creations from unauthor-
ized copying, while, at the same time, preserving the basic building
blocks of facts and ideas for the public domain so that others may use
100. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1991) ("The
most fundamental axiom of copyright law is that '[n]o author may copyright his ideas or the facts
he narrates.'" (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556
(1985))). See also Ginsburg, supra note 11. The author states:
[I]n principal, no matter how much original authorship the work displays, the facts
and ideas it exposes are free for the taking.... But the very same facts and ideas may
be divorced from the context imposed by the author, and restated or reshuffled by sec-
ond comers, even if the author was the first to discover the facts or to propose the
ideas. As a result of the "fact/expression or idea/expression dichotomy:' the scope of
copyright protection in an informational work may be quite scanty.
Id. at 1868.
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them to create new works."' The 1879 Supreme Court decision in Baker
v. Selden0 2 represents the beginning of the modem fact/expression doc-
trine. '°3 In Baker, the Court emphasized that, while a copyright in a
bookkeeping treatise protects the author's explanation of his bookkeep-
ing system, it does not protect the bookkeeping system itself.
'lc
Later decisions, most notably in Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 105 elaborated upon the doctrine and explored its difficulties as
well. Judge Learned Hand, the author of the Nichols opinion, recognized
that the major problem with the idea/expression dichotomy and, by im-
plication, the fact/expression dichotomy, is uncertainty over where to
draw the line between the idea or fact and the expression.'0 If expression
means only the literal words used in a text, copyright law would protect
a work only from verbatim copying and no more.' 7 According to Judge
Hand, what divides permissible borrowing of an "idea" from impermis-
sible theft of an author's "expression" is a boundary that can never be
fixed, but resides somewhere along a continuum of varying levels of ab-
straction. 0 8 The more abstractly an idea of a work is expressed, the less
likely it is to be protected; conversely, the more concretely the idea is
realized, the more likely it is protected expression.' 9 As some recent
court decisions have noted, Judge Hand's "abstractions test" is really not
101. See Robert A. Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, 29 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 560, 560 (1982). See also Nash v. CBS, 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th
Cir. 1990).
The court stated:
Intellectual (and artistic) progress is possible only if each author builds on the work
of others. No one invents even a tiny fraction of the ideas that make up our cultural
heritage. Once a work has been written and published, any rule requiring people to
compensate the author slows progress in literature and art, making useful expres-
sions "too expensive" forcing authors to re-invent the wheel.... Every work uses
scraps of thought from thousands of predecessors, far too many to compensate even
if the legal system were frictionless, which it isn't.
Id. at 1540. See generally 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 13.03[B][2], at 13-69 to 13-
70.
102. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). See Gorman, supra note 101, at 560.
103. See, e.g., Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Sports Eye, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Penn.
1976).
104. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1980). See also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2005) (incorpo-
rating Baker).
105. 45 E2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
106. See id. at 121.
107. See id. (noting that copyright law "cannot be limited literally to the text, else a pla-
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a test, but an articulation of a line-drawing problem that must be ad-
dressed anew in each individual case.' 0
A seminal expression of the prohibition on copyrighting facts them-
selves came in the 1918 Supreme Court decision, International News
Service v. Associated Press,"' in which the Supreme Court announced a
federal common-law "quasi-property" right in the dissemination of in-
formation. At issue in that case were the news reports the Associated
Press ("AP") published on the East Coast. Rival International News Ser-
vice ("INS") had been copying those reports and relaying them to its
Midwest and West Coast papers simultaneously or even ahead of their
receipt by the AP's local counterparts. In rejecting the AP's complaint,
the Court made a clear, constitutionally based statement regarding the
non-copyrightability of factual information:
It is not to be supposed that the framers of the Constitution,
when they empowered Congress 'to promote the progress of sci-
ence and useful art, by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and dis-
coveries' intended to confer upon one who might happen to be
the first to report a historic event the exclusive right for any pe-
riod to spread the knowledge of it."
2
This generally accepted aversion to copyrighting facts carried
through to the federal circuits and district courts as well. For example, in
Greenbie v. Noble, the court was presented with the alleged copyright
infringement of the plaintiff's historical account of the life of Anna Ella
Carroll, a member of the Lincoln cabinet." 3 The court carefully distin-
guished between the non-copyrightable factual elements of the historical
work and the copyrightable expressive elements:
It is well settled that the facts concerning the actual life of an
historic character are in the public domain and are not entitled to
copyright protection. However, the fictionalizing of events and
incidents in the life of an historic figure is the author's original
treatment of the life of such figure and is subject to protection
against appropriation by others. In such case, however, the copy-
right does not protect the entire work but extends only to those
110. See Nash v. CBS, 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Sometimes called the 'ab-
stractions test,' Hand's insight is not a 'test' at all. It is a clever way to pose the difficulties that
require courts to avoid either extreme of the continuum of generality. It does little to help
resolve a given case .... "). See also CCC Info. Servs. Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports,
Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 69 n.16 (2d Cir. 1994).
111. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
112. Id. at 234 (citations omitted).
113. 151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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matters which are the result of the author's independent labor,
skill and ingenuity."
4
In 1966, the Second Circuit employed similar reasoning in dealing
with the protection of biographical works in Rosemont Enterprises, Inc.
v. Random House, Inc."':
Biographies, of course, are fundamentally personal histories and
it is both reasonable and customary for biographies to refer to
and utilize earlier works dealing with the subject of the work and
occasionally to quote directly from such works. This practice is
permitted because of the public benefit in encouraging the de-
velopment of historical and biographical works and their public
116distribution ....
Taking this rationale further, the Rosemont court, using language that
would be repeated 25 years later in Feist,"7 vehemently rejected the view
that a second-comer is absolutely precluded from saving time and effort
by referring to and relying upon prior published material. It clearly re-
jected the industrious collection doctrine approach, stating that "[i]t is
just such wasted effort that the proscription against the copyright of
ideas and facts, and to a lesser extent the privilege of fair use, are de-
signed to prevent."" 8
b. The Merger Doctrine
The merger doctrine is a collateral branch of the idea/expression di-
chotomy, although it somewhat blurs the line between idea and
expression. Under the merger doctrine, a court may exclude from copy-
right protection expressions of ideas that can be expressed only in one way
or in a very limited number of ways based on the logic that copyrighting
such an expression would effectively copyright the idea as well. Al-
though it ostensibly prohibits copyrights in what would otherwise be
protectable expression, the merger doctrine, like the idea/expression
dichotomy, also reflects the law's general aversion to exclusive owner-
ship in facts and their removal from the public domain.
The merger doctrine was first announced in Morrissey v. Procter &
Gamble Co.,'' 9 a 1967 decision dealing with the alleged infringement of
114. Id. at 65 (citations omitted). See also Lake v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 140 E
Supp. 707, 708-09 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
115. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
116. Id. at 307 (citations omitted). See also Gardner v. Nizer, 391 F Supp. 940, 942
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Fuld v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 390 F. Supp. 877, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
117. Feist Publ'n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 354 (1991).
118. Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 310.
119. 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
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the plaintiff's copyright in a set of rules for a "sweepstakes"-type con-
test. In holding for the defendants, the court stated:
When the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that
"the topic necessarily requires," if not only one form of expres-
sion, at best only a limited number, to permit copyrighting
would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting a mere hand-
ful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities of future use of the
substance. In such circumstances it does not seem accurate to
say that any particular form of expression comes from the sub-
ject matter. However, it is necessary to say that the subject
matter would be appropriated by permitting the copyrighting of
its expression. We cannot recognize copyright as a game of
chess in which the public can be checkmated.2 °
c. The Emergence of New Emphasis on the Public Domain
As a number of other scholars have demonstrated,' 2' since 1960 the
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the constitu-
tional dimensions of the public domain, including the principle that it is
the public that "owns" public domain materials and that these "ownership"
rights are irrevocable-i.e., once something becomes part of the public
domain, it will forever remain part of the public domain. For example, in
the famous Sears/Compco122 decisions, the Court held that the states couldnot prohibit copying of unpatentable public domain materials:
An unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent has
expired, is in the public domain and may be made and sold by
whoever chooses to do so.... To allow a State by use of its law
of unfair competition to prevent the copying of an article which
represents too slight an advance to be patented would be to per-
mit the State to block off from the public something which
federal law has said belongs to the public.
2
1
120. Id. at 678-79 (citations omitted). See also Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn
Ornaments, Inc., 843 F2d 600, 606 (1st Cir. 1988) ("When there is essentially only one way
to express an idea, the idea and its expression are inseparable and copyright is no bar to copy-
ing that expression."); Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 709 (2d Cir.
1992).
121. See, e.g., Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAY-
TON. L. REV. 215 (2002) (surveying the history and development of the public domain in
intellectual property law).
122. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
123. Sears, 376 U.S. at 231-32. See also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6
(1966); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974). But see Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability? The Inter-
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B. The Industrious Collection Doctrine
Under the 1976 Copyright Act
After the introduction of the industrious collection doctrine more
than eighty years ago and the concomitant swing back toward investment
of labor as a justification for copyright protection, the lower courts began
to struggle with the very underpinnings of the industrious collection doc-
trine, particularly after the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act. Under
the 1976 Act, courts were divided regarding the doctrine's continued vi-
ability. Although the majority of federal courts had never embraced the
industrious collection doctrine,'" the doctrine had considerable staying
power in some circuits.' Some courts continued to apply the doctrine,
viewing it as the only viable method by which to provide meaningful
protection for factual compilations. Other courts tried to avoid any direct
discussion of whether factual works are indeed copyrightable, preferring
instead to assume that they are, and relying instead on the fair use de-
fense as an indirect way of allowing defendants to freely use the
underlying factual material.
Some courts, however, began showing overt uneasiness with the in-
dustrious collection doctrine and its questionable underpinnings, leading
to confusion and internal inconsistency in the reasoning of their deci-
sions. Other courts went even further and explicitly repudiated the
doctrine, turning their focus instead back to the creative elements of a
compilation as the touchstone of copyrightability. These unsuccessful
attempts to reconcile the industrious collection doctrine with modem
copyright jurisprudence, laid the groundwork for an outright repudiation
of the industrious collection doctrine in Feist.
Despite these simultaneous but divergent trends in the copyrightabil-
ity of compilations, lower courts continued to hold that actual facts and
other information-based materials themselves are not copyrightable.
section of the Intellectual Property and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond A
Critique of Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp., 18 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 259, 305-20 (1995) (de-
scribing Goldstein as inconsistent with public domain principles).
124. See infra Part II.B. 3-5. See also Ethan L. Wood, Note, Copyrighting the Yellow
Pages: Finding Originality in Factual Compilations, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1319, 1322-23 (1994).
125. See, e.g., Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publ'ns, Inc., 916 E 2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990),
cert. granted, 498 U.S. 808 (1990); S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory Pub-
lishers, 756 F.2d 801 (11th Cir. 1985); Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 683 F. Supp. 1204
(N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd, 905 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990), vacated, 499 U.S. 944 (1991); Hutchin-
son Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co. of Minn., 586 F. Supp. 911 (D. Minn. 1984), rev'd 770
F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1985); Fin. Info. Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv. Inc., 599 F. Supp. 994,
997-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 751 E2d 501 (2d Cir. 1984); Cent. Tel. Co. v. Johnson Publ'g
Co., 526 E Supp. 838 (D. Colo. 1981); Quinto v. Legal Times, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554, 559
(D.D.C. 1981); Nw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Bedco, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 299, 301 (D. Minn. 1980); Nat'l
Research Bureau, Inc. v. Kucker, 481 E Supp. 612, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v.
Nationwide Indep. Directory Serv. Inc., 371 E Supp. 900, 905 (W.D. Ark. 1974).
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Courts interpreting the 1976 Act also continued to emphasize the impor-
tance of the public domain, pointing to its constitutional underpinnings.
After promulgation of the 1976 Act, however, the case law on copyright-
able subject matter began to give detailed, policy-based analyses as well.
Unlike the industrious collection decisions that followed in the wake of
the 1909 Act, which failed to grasp the purposes served by copyright
law, post-1976 decisions were careful to adhere to the basic goals that
copyright law aims to promote.
1. Copyrights in Facts and Other Information-Based
Materials, Preservation of the Public Domain,
and the Policy Underlying Copyright Law
Unlike the 1909 Act, the 1976 Copyright Act included an express
definition of the term "compilation," which, for the first time, drew an
express statutory connection between compilations and "original works
of authorship:"
A "compilation" is a work formed by the collection and assem-
bling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected,
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as
a whole constitutes an original work of authorship. The term
"compilation" includes collective works. 26
A separate section of the 1976 Act also clarified the scope of protection
for compilations, specifying that:
The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only
to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distin-
guished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and
does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material.
The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not af-
fect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of,
any copyright protection in the preexisting material.
27
This definition expressly applies the originality requirement to compila-
tions. It also compels a court to examine the nature of a compilation's
"selection, coordination, or arrangement" in order to determine whether
the compilation is "an original work of authorship" protectable under 35
U.S.C. § 102(a).
Likewise, section 102(b) of the 1976 Act also expressly codified the
common-law concepts of the idea/expression and fact/expression di-
126. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2005).
127. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2005).
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chotomies.'25 Under section 102(b), "in no case does copyright protection
for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, proc-
ess, system, method of operation, concept, principle or discovery."'' 9
Sections 102(a) and 103 also implicitly codify the fact/expression di-
chotomy by according copyright protection only to "original works of
authorship"'3 and granting protection of compilations and derivative
works "only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as
distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work." "'
The 1976 Act does not, however, resolve the ambiguities in the
idea/expression doctrine that Judge Hand identified in the Nichols deci-
sion. Nowhere among the definitions in section 101 is there a definition
of "fact" or "expression."
Furthermore, the 1976 Act's use of the phrase "original work of au-
thorship," which replaced the phrase "all the writings of an author" in
the 1909 Act, was left purposefully undefined. Much like the Copyright
Clause of the Constitution, the 1976 Act provides guidance in defining
originality only in very general terms. Courts were thus left to develop
an understanding of "originality" in their own terms. Nevertheless, the
legislative history of the 1976 Act shows that Congress intended for
courts to incorporate their own standards for the necessary level of origi-
nality, as established in their interpretations of the 1909 Act. 32 The
legislative history of the 1976 Act also clarifies that the basic criteria for
copyrightable subject matter (including original authorship) applies
equally to both works containing preexisting material and those that are
purely original, thus protecting only the original contribution of the
compiler or arranger, and not any preexisting facts or data.
33
After the enactment of the 1976 Act, courts dealing with historical
and other fact-based works began to take a much more policy-oriented
approach to these cases, growing increasingly aware of the risks of
granting exclusive rights in facts and knowledge. They show a height-
ened understanding of the possible chilling effects that such exclusivity
could have on other authors and late-comers who were trying to tackle
other issues or pursue other endeavors. A few courts also began to em-
phasize the constitutional origins of the ideal of the public domain.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 80-84.
129. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2005).
130. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
131. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b).
132. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976).
133. Id. at 57. See also Harper & Row, Publ'g, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 581
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Copyright does not preclude others from using the ideas or
information revealed by the author's work. It pertains to the literary ... form in which the
author expressed intellectual concepts... ) (quoting S. Rep No. 93-983, at 107-08 (1974)).
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For example, in Alexander v. Haley, the court dealt with, inter alia,
the defendant's alleged infringement of the plaintiff's copyright in a
novel and pamphlet that were amalgams of fact and fiction derived from
the somber history of slavery in the United States. ' In determining
whether there had been a taking of copyrightable elements of the work,
the court agreed with the defendant that "each of the similarities asserted
by the plaintiff is in one or more of several categories of attributes of
written work which are not subject to the protection of the copyright
laws,"' pointing to three such categories in particular. First, the court
rejected the plaintiff's claim of infringement based on "matters of his-
torical or contemporary fact," for "[n]o claim of copyright protection can
arise from the fact that the plaintiff has written about such historical and
factual items. .,,I6 Second, the court rejected the plaintiff's claim of
infringement based on material traceable to common sources or to the
public domain because such material "can no more be the subject of
copyright protection than the use of a date or the name of a president or
a more conventional piece of historical information." 3 7 Third, the court
rejected copyright infringement claims based on borrowed scenes a
faire,'38 which are incidents, characters, or settings that, as a practical
matter, are indispensable to, or at least standard in, the treatment of a
given topic.
Similarly, the courts perceived as the leading authorities in the for-
mulation of United States' copyright laws, such as the Second and Ninth
Circuits, have permitted extensive reliance on prior works of history and
emphasized that factual information must remain in the public domain. 39
For instance, in Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., o the Second
Circuit held that second comers must be allowed to rely extensively on
prior works of history, thus rejecting case law in other circuits that held
134. 460 F Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
135. Id. at 44.
136. Id. at 44-45. See also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod. Inc. v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977); Signo Trading Int'l Ltd. v. Gordon, 535 F. Supp.
362 (N.D. Cal. 1981); McMahon v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 486 E Supp. 1296 (E.D. Miss. 1980).
137. Alexander, 460 F. Supp. at 45.
138. Id. See also Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485,
489 (9th Cir. 1984); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980)
(providing the underlying rationale for the scenes a faire doctrine: "[b]ecause it is virtually
impossible to write about a particular historical era of fictional theme without employing cer-
tain 'stock' of standard literary devices, we have held that scenes a faire are not copyrightable
as a matter of law"); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir.
1976).
139. See discussion supra Part II.A.1, which deals, inter alia, with trends in the Second
Circuit before the enactment of the 1976 Act. See also Oxford Book Co. v. Coll. Entrance
Book Co., 98 F.2d 688, 691 (2d Cir. 1938).
140. 618 F.2d 972. See also Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 E2d 1365, 1369-
71 (5th Cir. 1981).
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the results of original research are copyrightable.4' The appellee in
Hoehling had written a literary account of the historical story of the Hin-
denburg. The appellee admitted that he consulted and relied on the
appellant's more factual and objective account for some of the details in
his work.
The Second Circuit's holding touched upon a fundamental policy
underlying copyright law:
The rationale for this doctrine is that the cause of knowledge is
best served when history is the common property of all, and
each generation remains free to draw upon the discoveries and
insights of the past. Accordingly, the scope of copyright in his-
torical accounts is narrow indeed, embracing no more than the
author's original expression of particular facts and theories al-
ready in the public domain. As the case before us illustrates,
absent wholesale usurpation of another's expression, claims of
copyright infringement where works of history are at issue are
rarely successful.'42
Conducting a detailed examination of, and ultimately rejecting, the
plaintiff's various claims of authorship, the court concluded that under
fundamental copyright policy all of the materials taken from Hoehling's
book were non-copyrightable. 1
43
In its 1984 decision, Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Play-
ers, Inc., the Ninth Circuit followed the path set by the Second Circuit.'"
Because of the limited number of ways in which certain facts and factual
information can be presented, the court held that protecting the public's
interest in such limited modes of expression requires that the "similarity
of expression may have to amount to verbatim reproduction or very close
paraphrasing before a factual work will be deemed infringed.' 45 Thus, in
refusing to extend copyright protection to the Landsberg plaintiff's book
of game strategy, the Ninth Circuit essentially indicated that there are
141. The Second Circuit clearly repudiated such an approach in Rosemont Enterprises
Inc. v. Random House Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 1966). See supra text accompanying
notes 115-118.
142. Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 974 (emphasis added). In Hoehling, the court noted that the
"financial reward guaranteed to the copyright holder is but an incident of this general objec-
tive, rather than an end in itself.... Knowledge is expanded as well by granting new authors
of historical works a relatively free hand to build upon the work of their predecessors." Id. at
980.
143. Id. at 974.
144. 736 E2d 485 (9th Cir. 1984). See also Ekern v. Sew/Fit Co., 622 F Supp. 367, 370
(N.D. I11. 1985); Evans v. Wallace Berrie & Co., 681 F. Supp. 813, 817 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
145. Landsberg, 736 F.2d at 488.
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only a very few ways to tell a person how to win a game of Scrabble.
46
Any other approach might allow the first few writers to tackle a factual
topic to exhaust the limited modes of expression available to convey it.
Consequently, these few writers would have the joint power exclusively
to control the facts and ideas that otherwise would and should be part of
the public domain.
In a later 1987 decision, Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 47 the
Ninth Circuit encountered a similar fact pattern and again pointed out
that facts, like ideas, are never protected by copyright law. Absent a
wholesale appropriation of another's expression of those facts, such that
both the total concept and feel of the two works are substantially similar,
no claim of infringement may be maintained. 1
48
Likewise, in the wake of the 1976 Act, the Supreme Court touched
upon the essence of modem copyright law in Harper & Row, Publishers
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, one of its most important copyright law deci-
sions from the mid-1980's. 49 Although the Court's decision in Harper &
Row was at face value concerned with the "fair use" defense as applied
to The Nation's publication of numerous extracts from President Ford's
biography, the Court also took this opportunity to discuss more generally
exactly what protective scope fact-based works enjoyed under copyright
law. Quoting from the Court's earlier opinion in Sony Corp. of America
v. Universal City Studios, Inc.' 50 Justice O'Connor's opinion for the
Court in Harper & Row touched upon the underlying principle of the
Copyright Clause and its application to works of fiction and non-fiction
alike:
[Copyright] is intended to motivate the creative activity of au-
thors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to
allow the public access to the products of their genius after the
limited period of exclusive control has expired.
5'
O'Connor wrote that "no author may copyright facts or ideas,'
52
since "copyright is limited to those aspects of the work-termed 'ex-
pression'-that display the stamp of the author's originality."'
53
146. Id. at 489.
147. 827 E2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987).
148. Id. at 572 (affirming no infringement where trivia game referenced plaintiff's trivia
books).
149. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
150. 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (discussing the Patent and Copyright Clause and noting that
one of the purposes of copyright is to place material into the public domain, although with a
decidedly idiosyncratic view of the public domain).
151. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 429).
152. Id. at 547.
153. Id.
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Subsequent users are therefore free to "copy from a prior author's work
those constituent elements that are not original," such as "facts, or mate-
rials in the public domain-as long as such use does not unfairly
appropriate the author's original contributions.', 54 By refusing to recog-
nize a copyright in facts alone, the law is able to serve the public's
interest in the free flow of information. 5 Consequently, although the
Supreme Court did not deal directly with the viability of the industrious
collection doctrine, it did plant the seeds for its later decision in Feist.
156
The Harper & Row Court also placed the idea/expression dichotomy
within its broader constitutional context, pointing out that the doctrine
"'strike[s] a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the
Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still pro-
tecting an author's expression.'"'" Even Justice Brennan, in dissent,
commented on why facts cannot be copyrighted. First noting the eco-
nomic rationale for this rule, Justice Brennan explained that, "were an
author able to prevent subsequent authors from using concepts, ideas, or
facts contained in his or her work, the creative process would wither, and
scholars would be forced into unproductive replication of the research of
their predecessors.'1 58 He then looked at the broader constitutional ra-
tionale for this rule, explaining that such a limitation on copyright
protections also ensures consonance with important First Amendment
values:
Our "profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,"
leaves no room for a statutory monopoly over information and
ideas.. . . A broad dissemination of principles, ideas, and factual
information is crucial to the robust public debate and informed
citizenry that are "the essence of self-government." And every
citizen must be permitted freely to marshal ideas and facts in the
advocacy of particular political choices.'59
Using works of history as an example, Justice Brennan emphasized
that, at its core, copyright law does not protect the most valuable aspect
of factual works:
154. Id. at 548.
155. Id.
156. But see Black's Guide, Inc. v. Mediamerica, Inc., No. C-90-0819, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16272, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 1990) (pointing to Harper & Row's statement that
"[cireation of a nonfiction work, even a compilation of pure fact, entails originality" as sup-
porting the "sweat" theory).
157. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983)).
158. Id. at 582.
159. Id. (citations omitted).
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It is the labor of collecting, sifting, organizing, and reflecting
that predominates in the creation of works of history such as this
one. The value this labor produces lies primarily in the informa-
tion and ideas revealed, and not in the particular collocation of
words through which the information and ideas are expressed.
Copyright thus does not protect that which is often of most value
in a work of history .... 60
Accordingly, the impulse to compensate authors for subsequent use
of the information and ideas produced by their labors is entirely under-
standable, for there is an "inequity [that] seems to lurk in the idea that
much of the fruit of the historian's labor may be used without compensa-
tion." 6' And yet, Justice Brennan continued, in a passage that would be
adopted seven years later by the majority in Feist:
This, however, is not some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory
scheme intended primarily to ensure a return for works of the
imagination. Congress made the affirmative choice that the
copyright laws should apply in this way: "Copyright does not
preclude others from using the ideas or information revealed by
the author's work. It pertains to the literary ... form in which
the author expressed intellectual concepts."'
' 62
2. The Decline of the Industrious Collection Doctrine
Although the industrious collection doctrine both originated in and
was subsequently rejected by both the Second and Ninth Circuits,' 63 the
Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Circuits continued strongly to support the
doctrine until the Supreme Court's decision in Feist.
160. Id. at 589.
161. Id.
162. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 56-57 (1976)). But see San Francisco Arts
& Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm'n, 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (holding 7-2 that the First
Amendment did not restrict Congress' power to grant a statutory trademark in the word
"Olympic" to the United States Olympics Commission); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (holding 6-3 that the First Amendment did not protect a
magazine that published excerpts from Gerald Ford's memoirs in advance of authorized publi-
cation date); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (holding 5-4 that
the First Amendment did not give a news station the right to broadcast a videotape of the
plaintiff's human cannonball act).
163. The Ninth Circuit originally embraced the industrious collection doctrine as a basis
for copyright protection in Leon v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir.
1937) (citing Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing, 281 F 83 (2d Cir.
1922)).
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A recent example of the doctrine at work is the Seventh Circuit deci-
sion in Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co.,'64 in which the court
addressed the alleged copying of a gardening directory. The names and
addresses in the garden directory were arranged alphabetically, requiring
no original insights on the part of the compiler.'65 The court, citing the
Second Circuit's now rejected application of the industrious collection
doctrine in Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co., found the directory war-
ranted copyright protection. It asserted that "only industrious collection"
is required since "copyright protects not the individual names and ad-
dresses but the compilation, the product of the compiler's industry,"'66
thus protecting the fruits of any substantial and independent effort, re-
gardless of the originality or creativity involved.
Another relatively recent example of the industrious collection doc-
trine is the Eighth Circuit's decision in United Telephone Co. of Missouri
v. Johnson Publishing Co. 67 The defendant had updated its own inde-
pendent directory by verifying new listings obtained from the local
telephone company's directory. The court found that by comparing its
directory to and obtaining new subscriber listings from the telephone
company's directory, the defendant had created a second work of sub-
stantial similarity to the telephone company's directory, thereby
infringing the telephone company's legitimately asserted copyright in its
directory.'
6
In addition to this line of cases overtly applying the industrious col-
lection doctrine, there is a second line of cases that purported to require
originality as a prerequisite for copyright protection, but, in practice,
simply measured originality as a function of industry. For example, the
Eighth Circuit's 1986 decision in West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data
Central, Inc. revolved around Mead Data's proposal to cite page num-
bers from West Publishing's legal reporters in Mead Data's computerized
LEXIS reports of the same opinions, thus providing "jump" or "pin-
point" citations to the cited passage's location in the West reporter.
69
164. 566 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1977). Prior to Schroeder the Seventh Circuit had already
adopted the industrious collection doctrine in a few cases. See, e.g., G.R. Leonard & Co. v.
Stack, 386 F.2d 38 (7th Cir. 1967); Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc.,
131 F.2d 809, 812-13 (7th Cir. 1942).
165. Schroeder, 566 F.2d at 6.
166. Id. at 5. Accord Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir.
1990), rev'd, 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 905 F.2d 1081 (7th
Cir. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1408 (1991); Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co. of
Minn., Inc., 770 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1985).
167. 855 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1988).
168. Id. at 608-09.
169. 799 F.2d 1219, 1222 (8th Cir. 1986)("Mead"). See also the post-Feist case Oasis
Publishing Co. v. West Publishing Co., 924 F. Supp. 918 (D. Minn. 1996). In Oasis, a competi-
tor intended to convert the decisions in West's Florida Cases to a CD-ROM format using
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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's grant of a preliminary
injunction against Mead Data.'70 At first, the court correctly pointed out
that an arrangement of preexisting materials may receive copyright pro-
tection and that "in each case the arrangement must be evaluated in light
of the originality and intellectual-creation standards" of prior case law.'7'
The court seemed to lose this standard, however, for although West Pub-
lishing had arranged the cases in a purely mechanical fashion with no
original insight or creativity, the court stated that "a work need only be
the product of a modicum of intellectual labor" to be protectable, a test
that West's reporters easily met.' Because Mead had not alleged that
West had copied its case arrangement from any other source, the court
concluded that the requirement of originality posed no obstacles to copy-
right protection.' In response to the argument that this essentially
granted copyright protection to page numbers, the court rejoined that
"protection for the numbers is not sought for their own sake. It is sought,
rather, because access to these particular numbers ... would give users
of LEXIS a large part of what West has spent so much labor and industry
in compiling,', 74 thus overlooking the lack of originality in the arrange-
ment of page numbers. '
As discussed below, however, many other courts decisions, and ulti-
mately Feist itself, not only rejected the premise of the "industrious
West's page numbering. West conceded that such parallel citations would be fair use but in-
sisted that it would infringe upon West's compilation copyright. Tracking Mead the court
found protectable creativity in West's arrangement of the cases first by states; then by court
level; then by whether they are opinions, memoranda, or table dispositions; and finally alpha-
betically and chronologically. The court further held that internal pagination was an integral
part of the arrangement because "by determining an internal page from each case in a given
volume, the user could sort and determine West's arrangement with Oasis' CD-ROM product."
Id. at 924, 926.
170. Mead, 799 E2d at 1222.
171. Id. at 1225.
172. Id. at 1227.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. But see id. at 1248 (Oliver, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)(rejecting
idea that "sequential publication of court opinions in the chronological order in which the
cases are handed down" can be copyrightable under the 1976 Act or that "the scope of West's
copyright is broad enough to protect the placement of arabic numbers on the pages of the
volumes in which those opinions are published"); see also Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787
F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that pagination of public domain materials "is nothing
more than public domain numbers," not an original work of authorship, unless displaying
some meaningful pattern or judgment). Two other cases expressly deny copyright protection to
the pagination of a public domain work. See Eggers v. Sun Sales Corp., 263 F. 373 (2d Cir.
1920); Banks Law Publ'g Co. v. Lawyers' Co-op. Publ'g Co., 169 F. 386 (2d Cir. 1909), ap-
peal dismissed, 223 U.S. 738 (1911). But see Stephen C. Carlson, Note, The Law and
Economics of Star Pagination, 2 GEO. MASON U.L. REv. 421 (1995) (arguing that economic
analysis supports the Eighth Circuit decision in West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central,
Inc.).
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collection" doctrine but also required an affirmative showing that the
allegedly infringed material demonstrates originality of authorship.
1 76
3. The Fair Use Defense as a Shield Against
Exclusive Ownership of Facts
A few courts have tried to avoid the question of database protection
in general and the industrious collection doctrine in particular. Instead,
they simply assumed that the work at issue was entitled to copyright pro-
tection and tried to resolve the disputes indirectly via the fair use defense
as a means of "freeing" factual information for use by the public. These
courts, however, went to such extraordinary lengths as to stretch the de-
fense beyond its limits.
The fair use defense is a limitation on the copyright owner's exclu-
sive rights. Section 107 of the 1976 Act 177 provides that "the fair use of a
copyrighted work ... for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching .... scholarship, or research is not an infringement of
copyright." It also provides that "[i]n determining whether the use made
in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall in-
clude-(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is for a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work."
The case of New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface'8 serves
as a good example of this trend. The court dealt with whether a copy-
righted work may be indexed by an outsider without the permission of
the copyright holder. The plaintiff's newspaper, The New York limes,
published its own annual indices of citations to names and other data in
newspaper issues from that year.'79 Finding plaintiff's indices inadequate,
the defendants published their own index to those indices but collated
the citations over several years.'80 The court refused to grant a prelimi-
nary injunction, despite the defendant's confession to copying names
directly from the plaintiff's directory:
[T]he substance of plaintiff's copyrights ... covers the correla-
tion of personal names, with citations to the pages and columns
176. See infra Part 1.B.5.
177. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2005).
178. N.Y. Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217 (D.N.J. 1977)
("Roxbury").
179. Id. at 218.
180. Id. at 219.
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of The New York Times. Defendants have not copied any of
these correlations, but, rather, have taken only the personal
names appearing in the Times indexes.'
Because the defendant did not appropriate the corresponding citations to
pages and columns, the court held that the defendant's index likely either
was not an infringement or was excused under the doctrine of fair use.'82
Although the court thus focused upon the expression inherent in the
author's final product, it recognized that copyrightable expression goes
beyond the mere superficial arrangement or ordering of the data.'83 Al-
though correlations drawn between facts may still be criticized as
lacking the required creativity,'8 the scope of protection afforded by this
broadened view of what is copyrightable in a compilation of facts is still
significantly more than that afforded under an unadulterated application
of the originality requirement. Even under a pure application of the in-
dustrious collection doctrine, the court's attempt to distinguish between
different forms of data is, at best, baseless. In terms of solely the labor
invested or saved, copying only the names gathered by the plaintiffs is
not in any meaningful way very different from copying the entire work.
In both situations the defendant was simply free-riding on the labor al-
ready invested by the plaintiff. Something else must therefore have
motivated the court's analysis-most likely the court's disinterest in
dealing with the uneasy question of copyrightability of compilations.
The court's application of the four "fair use" factors in this case is
particularly revealing. In a typical fair-use analysis, a court will look first
at whether the alleged fair use is commercial or non-commercial. In
Roxbury, however, the court looked first at the purpose and character of
the use, identifying at least two main motives that the defendants had in
copying from the plaintiff's indices: (1) to make money, and (2) to facili-
181. Id. at 222 (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 226-27. The court stated that even if the personal names were independently
copyrightable, the defendant's copying of them was excused under the doctrine of fair use.
Because the defendant's publication referred back to the plaintiff's index, the court reasoned,
"the effect of [defendant's publication] on the potential market for the Times Index appears
slight or nonexistent." Id. at 226.
183. Although sufficient correlation arguably exists among data merely by their inclu-
sion in a compilation, a court may nonetheless require additional elements of creative
arrangement. Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 204, 208 n.3 (2d Cir.
1986).
184. When the arrangement of data truly reflects creative aspects of a compiler's work, a
copyright is deserved. Most compilations, however, contain only exhaustive lists of names or
other facts and do not display creativity in style or form. Because such arrangements are typi-
cally chronological, numerical, or alphabetical, they appear to reflect insufficient creativity.
Alternatively, the layout of information in an alphabetical or similarly routine format should
be dismissed as non-copyrightable because it is an expression indistinguishable from the un-
derlying idea.
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tate public access to useful information in the plaintiff's newspapers. '
Although the court was undoubtedly correct in finding that the defen-
dant's index would serve the public interest, this hardly seems significant
since an alleged infringing work usually serves the public interest in at
least some manner. Perhaps for this very reason, the typical "fair use"
analysis does not begin by looking at the public interest. Instead, public
interest is typically a factor reserved for the threshold question of
whether the plaintiff's work is in fact protected by copyright, and not
whether the defendant's work infringes that protection. Such a public
interest analysis could have led the court to conclude that the plaintiff's
work was factual and useful rather than creative in nature and thus was
non-copyrightable material that should remain in the public domain.
Nevertheless, in struggling to protect the free flow of facts, the court in
Roxbury went to extraordinary lengths to emphasize the defendant's con-
tribution to the public interest:
It seems likely that defendants' index will serve the public inter-
est in the dissemination of information. Without defendants'
index, an individual seeking to find articles which appeared in
the New York Times on a certain person whose career spanned,
say, forty years, would be compelled to search through forty
volumes of the Times Index.... On its face, defendants' index
appears to have the potential to save researchers a considerable
amount of time and, thus, facilitate the public interest in the dis-
semination of information.
86
Only as the second step in its fair use analysis did the court finally
consider the nature of the plaintiffs' copyrighted work. The court found
that the Times indices were basically a collection of facts, and "[s]ince
the Times Index is a work more of diligence than of originality or inven-
tiveness, defendants have greater license to use portions of the Times
Index under the fair use doctrine."87 Again, such explorations of a work's
factual or creative nature should be conducted during the threshold copy-
rightability analysis. Classifying the work as one "more of diligence than
of originality" suggests that, in the court's eyes, it does not deserve
copyright protection in the first place, providing another indication to the
court's struggle to accommodate the need to free the flow of facts and
information.
As the third step in its fair use analysis, the court considered whether
the amount and substance of the copied parts in relation to the copyrighted
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work as a whole were reasonable in light of the defendant's purpose in
copying the plaintiff's work. Here the court emphasized again that the
protected element in the plaintiff's work is the correlation of names to
page citations, an element that the defendants had not copied.' The
court thereby distinguished other directory cases that had employed the
industrious collection doctrine, stressing that these other cases involved
defendants who had copied the essence of the plaintiff's work in its en-
tirety as a new and virtually identical directory in direct competition with
the plaintiff's directory.'8 9
The court also noted the extent to which producing the defendant's
index required copying the names directly from the Times Index, and
that for all practical purposes, defendants could not have published their
index without such direct copying. ' 9° The plaintiff, however, correctly
pointed out that the defendant could have obtained the same information
directly from the newspaper issues, as had the compilers of the Times
Index.' 9' Had the court been loyal to the industrious collection doctrine,
it would not have allowed the defendants such leeway because the Times
Index required a significant expenditure of time and effort. The court,
however, did not take this path:
If defendants have copied from the Times Index both the per-
sonal names and the correlated citations to the New York Times,
plaintiffs' argument would have merit because defendants would
have produced an abridgement or other version of the Times In-
dex without expending efforts equal to the compilers of the
Times Index.
92
It is unclear, however, why the defendants would have had to appro-
priate both the names and their correlative citations under the industrious
collection doctrine. Taking only the names saved the defendants a sig-
nificant amount of resources and thus should have been prohibited under
the industrious collection doctrine. Even the court itself acknowledged
that its distinction between taking the names alone and taking both
names and citations was "not determinative" to its "fair use" analysis,
but simply "must be noted."' 93 Nonetheless, the court's analysis suggests
that copying of factual works will almost always survive a "fair use"
analysis as long as there is no identical or substantial copying of the
work.
188. Id. at 222.
189. Id. at 222-23.
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Interestingly, the court seems to suggest in a footnote that, regardless
of the amount or substance of the material copied, what the defendants
copied was not the true, copyrightable essence of the plaintiffs' work.
The court essentially divided compilations into two categories, factual
compilations and subjective compilations, hinting that the latter category
merited greater protection than the former.'94 The former is mechanical
compilation of facts while the latter is the product of the compiler's
judgment and discretion in choosing which entries to include. Although
the court was reluctant to take the next logical step and expressly declare
the plaintiffs' indices to be mere non-selective compilations of fact war-
ranting less protective scope the implications of the court's analysis are
clear. Content selected on inevitably objective criteria for automatic inclu-
sion in a compilation should remain in the public domain, for there are
very few ways to create such compilations. The upshot of this distinction
is that copyright law effectively protects only those elements of a work
of the least public value.
Fourth and last, the court considered the effect of the defendants'
name index on the potential market for the Times Index, which the court
found to be slight. 95 The defendants' index was useless without the cor-
responding Times Index volume because only the Times indices
themselves cited the actual articles.'96 The defendants' index therefore
did not compete directly with the plaintiffs' indices.' 97
Even more revealing is the court's response to the argument that the
defendants' index deprived the plaintiffs of their right to exploit their
copyrights. 98 The court viewed this argument as stating that a copy-
righted work cannot be indexed without permission from the copyright
holder in much the same way that filmmakers cannot make a movie from
a copyrighted play or novel. The court rejected this analogy, first because
the defendants had not copied the essence of plaintiffs' work, the correla-
tion of names and other data with page cites.' 99 As discussed above,
however, this explanation would fail under the industrious collection
doctrine, for it is irrelevant that the work itself was not entirely duplicated.
Second, the court rejected the analogy because the defendants' index had a
different function and format.200 Again, however, this fact is irrelevant un-
der the industrious collection doctrine if the defendants drew significantly
and extensively from the plaintiffs' copyrighted materials. Third, the court
194. Id. at 222 n.2.
195. Id. at 223.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 224.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 224-25.
200. Id. at 225.
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cited the fact that the Times Indices themselves contained nothing com-
parable to the defendants' index, yet another factor that would have
been irrelevant under a pure industrious collection analysis. °2
4. Questioning the Underpinnings of the
Industrious Collection Doctrine
Some courts at both the appellate court and district court level
started to explicitly doubt the foundation of the industrious collection
doctrine. These courts included some that had previously applied the
doctrine, such as the Seventh Circuit. The discussion that follows pro-
vides an illustration of such uneasiness at its peak, showing how courts
voiced their concerns regarding the consistency of the industrious collec-
tion doctrine with copyright doctrine while at the same time "excusing"
in economic terms their continued adherence to the doctrine as the only
meaningful means of supporting compilation creators. These courts' de-
cisions thus reflect confusion and internal inconsistency in their
reasoning and final resolutions. In their own way, however, these cases
prepared the ground for Feist's later explicit repudiation of the doctrine.
A good example is found in a 1982 district court decision, National
Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.2 °3 The court started by de-
scribing the copyright protection of compilations as "a doctrine in search
of conceptual underpinnings,"2°4 and a "troublesome legal issue because
it involves consideration of competing interests within the confines of a
statutory scheme better suited to other literary works. 2 °5 Describing the
compiler's contribution to knowledge as the collection of information
and not its arrangement, the court expressed concern about the compila-
tion industry: "If [its] protection is limited solely to the form of
expression, the economic incentives underlying the copyright laws are
largely swept away."26 The court admitted, however, that such economic
concerns nevertheless do not explain why courts fall back on copyright
201. Id. at 225.
202. See, e.g., Dow Jones & Co. v. Bd. of Trade, 546 F. Supp. 113, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(applying "fair use" defense and stating that "[a]uthors of compilations, therefore, must be
held to grant broader licenses for subsequent use than persons whose work is truly creative");
Nat'l Bus. Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. I11. 1982) (using similar
analysis). The Dow Jones court equivocated, however, about the legal basis for protecting
compilations. At first, the court cited "the subjective judgment and selectivity involved" in the
plaintiff's compilation but also noted the "effort" invested. 546 F. Supp. at 116.
203. 552 F. Supp. 89.
204. Id. at 93.
205. Id. at 91.
206. Id. at 92; See also Black's Guide, Inc. v. Mediamerica, Inc., No. C-90-0819, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16272, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 1990).
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law when other legal doctrines, such as the misappropriation doctrine,
can accomplish the same ends: 207
The courts have generally rested, however, not on an analysis of
copyright concepts but on the economic incentives premise of
copyright law and the injustice of permitting one to appropriate
the fruit of another's labor.08
Indeed, the court went even further, pointing to the questionable
constitutionality of protecting factual compilations: "[A]lphabetizing of
a list of names could hardly have been the originality which Congress
meant to reward.''209 Its grave doubts notwithstanding, however, the court
followed the industrious collection doctrine, providing a two-fold expla-
nation for its decision. First, the court noted that "there appears to
remain a lingering recognition that '[t]he second historian or second di-
rectory publisher cannot bodily appropriate the research of his
predecessor.' 2 0 Second, the court adverted to the fact that "the directory
cases, rather than being a breed apart, are the most striking illustrations
in copyright law that the misappropriation doctrine most commonly as-
sociated with International News Service v. Associated Press, has there
long found a house if not a home.""'
In another case, Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management Systems,In 212
Inc., the court found Rand McNally's roadway mileage guide non-
copyrightable as a compilation, and expressed its uneasiness with the in-
dustrious collection doctrine. This decision is unusual in a few respects.
207. Nat'l Bus. Lists, 552 F Supp. at 95.
208. Id. at 92. See also Fin. Info. Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv. Inc., 599 F Supp. 994,
999 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 751 F2d 501 (2d Cir. 1984). The court stated:
To deny copyright protection to FII's daily called bond service, even while preserv-
ing it for the annual cumulative volumes, would go a long way toward destroying
FI's incentive to collect and assemble bond data in a speedy, systematic way for
the convenience of its subscribers. Although according protection to compilations
"does not fit nicely into the conceptual framework of copyright law" such protec-
tion of the compiler's diligence is essential "because that is the only protection
which is meaningful."
Id. at 999 (citations omitted); Note, Copyright Law-Will the Denial of Copyright to an Au-
thor's Research Impede Scholarship? Miller v. Universal Studios, Inc., 605 F2d 1365 (5th Cir.
1981), 5 W. NEw. ENG. L. REV. 103, 121 (1982) ("Without ... protection, few would under-
take to compile a directory or draw a map since the substantial labor necessary to complete the
task might be sacrificed by the wholesale appropriation of the work by a copier."). But see
Denicola, supra note 97, at 530 (suggesting that the act of aggregating isolated pieces of in-
formation can be authorship, with the resulting collection of data being a work of authorship).
209. Nat'l Bus. Lists, 552 F Supp. at 93.
210. Id. at 95 (quoting Huie v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 184 F Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
211. Id. (citation omitted)
212. 591 F Supp. 726 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
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On the one hand, the court accepted the long-established idea that
"[c]ompilations of facts, however, have 'long rested securely within the
scope of copyright.'"23 Nevertheless, relying on National Business
List,' 4 the court also acknowledged that "the rationale behind protecting
such compilations, however, is unclear."2 '5 On the other hand, despite its
recognition that "another justification for protecting compilations of
facts relies on the compiler's 'subjective judgment and selectivity in
choosing items to a list,' ,,216 the court asserted that factual compilations
may still be protected by copyright by simple virtue of being the "result
of some level of compiler effort and industry."2"7
The court turned next to the question of whether the plaintiff had in-
vested the requisite "considerable time and effort" in the creation of its
roadway mileage guide. The court concluded that Rand McNally had not
produced evidence of sufficient effort, because it was not clear what por-
tion of their expense was spent updating the mileage tables and how
much of the information used by Rand McNally was actually in the pub-
lic domain and therefore not copyrightable.28 Without evidence of
adequate original efforts, the court could not find that Rand McNally's
contributions constituted sufficient effort. 2'9 The Rand McNally court not
only placed the burden on the plaintiff to show the connection between
his expenses and his work, but was also the first to ask whether the mate-
rial in question had required more than a trivial effort to compile,220
despite the fact that previous cases had simply assumed that all databases
require intensive investment of labor.
While such borrowing from accessible public domain materials is
very common in the database industry (with the exception of sole-source
databases providers), until Rand McNally courts had rarely dealt with
this question, perhaps because everyone had simply accepted as given
that all databases were created in the same laborious manner as the com-
pilations of old.22' The Rand McNally court's resurrection of this basic
inquiry to deny the plaintiff copyright protection, along with its stated
213. Id. at 731.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 203-211.
215. Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 591 F. Supp. 726, 731 (D.C. I11.
1983).
216. Id. at 732 n.4.
217. Id. at 733.
218. Id. at 733-34.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 733. But see United Tel. Co. v. Johnson Publ'g Co., 671 F. Supp. 1514 (W.D.
Miss. 1987)(finding telephone directories copyrightable but finding implicitly that creation of
the directories probably involved no labor), aff'd, 855 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1988).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
Trends in Production for Informational Works
doubts about the underpinnings of the industrious collection doctrine,
thus demonstrate its implicit uneasiness with this doctrine.222
Soon thereafter, the Seventh Circuit's 1985 decision in Rockford Map
Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Service Co. of Colorado223 declared that
"copyright laws protect the work, not the amount of effort expended," 224
thus de-emphasizing labor and finding originality only in creative ar-
rangements. The defendant, relying on the industrious collection
doctrine affirmed in Schroeder, argued that because the plaintiff had
spent little time preparing its maps, its efforts were "not very 'industri-
ous'" and its product was thus not copyrightable. 22' Rejecting this
argument, the court emphasized that the amount of time invested is ir-
relevant;226 after all, other types of work produced in an insignificant
amount of time are nonetheless copyrightable. 227 Though the court ap-
peared to reject the industrious collection doctrine as a basis for
protection, the court actually made no explicit judgment as to whether
labor, in and of itself, is protectable. Rather, the court simply re-
interpreted Jeweler's and Schroeder, two classic industrious collection
cases, as hinging on whether the compiler produced a "new" or original
arrangement, not on whether the compiler had invested a significant
amount of time and effort.228
Rockford Map created confusion within the Seventh Circuit probably
because it studiously avoided adopting the industrious collection doc-
trine while at the same time borrowing heavily from classical industrious
collection cases such as Jeweler's.2 29 Indeed, a statement the court made
in dicta at the end of its decision did nothing to ameliorate that confu-
sion:
All concede, as Learned Hand said in Jeweler's Circular ... that
"a second compiler may check back his independent work upon
222. In Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management Systems Inc., 600 F. Supp. 933 (N.D.
I11. 1984) ("Rand McNally If'), the district court granted in part Rand McNally's renewed
motion for summary judgment, finding copyrightable its mileage table data and certain mile-
age segment data in its maps. Id. at 934-35, 946.
223. 768 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1985).




228. Id. The court found that the work was a "new" and therefore "original" arrangement
of facts stating that "[tihe contribution of a collection of facts lies in their presentation, not in
the facts themselves." Id. at 149. But see Black's Guide, Inc. v. Mediamerica, Inc., No. C-90-
0819, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16272, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 1990) (stating that the contri-
bution of a collection of facts, particularly electronic ones, lies in the facts, and not in their
presentation); Nat'l Bus. Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89, 97 (N.D. I11.
1982).
229. See Rockford Map Publishers, 768 F.2d at 148.
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the original compilation." The right to "check back" does not
imply a right to start with the copyrighted work. Everyone must
do the same basic work, the same "industrious collection." 30
In light of the court's ruling in Rockford Map, the defendant in Rand
McNally I brought a motion for reconsideration. 23' The court conceded
that after Rockford Map, its previous reliance on the level of effort in-
volved in compiling data was erroneous.32 Instead, the proper analysis is
whether the compilation as a whole evinced originality in its arrange-
ment of facts. 233 Even under this latter rule, however, the court still found
the guides copyrightable because the collection of numerous maps and
the arrangement of data involved a "new arrangement or presentation of
facts.
,,234
The Rand McNally III court expressed its uneasiness with the indus-
trious collection doctrine, calling the law on factual compilation
copyrights a "tangled web ' 235 and admitting that it presents "intellectual
difficulties in determining where protectable copying of facts ends and
unlawful copying of the compilation begins. 236 As to the continued vi-
ability of the industrious collection doctrine, however, it concluded that
Schroeder37 remained solid law in the Seventh Circuit,2 38 and rejected the
proposition that Rockford Map moved away from concentrating on labor
expended to concentrating on originality.239 Trying to reconcile Rockford
Map's confusing pronouncements,2 ° the Rand McNally III court tried to
draw formalistic distinctions between infringing map-makers and in-
fringing compilers2 4 '-a distinction that ultimately fails to satisfy
242anyone. 2 Ignoring the conflicting case law and the 1976 Act's express
230. Id. at 149.
231. Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 634 E Supp. 604-05 (N.D. Ill.
1986) ("Rand McNally III").
232. Id. at 606.
233. Id. at 606-07.
234. Id. at 607.
235. Id. at 608.
236. Id.
237. Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 E2d 3 (7th Cir. 1977).
238. Rand McNally 11, 634 F Supp. at 608.
239. Id.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 228-229.
241. Rand McNally 11, 634 F. Supp. at 608.
242. Another district court case in the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected the idea that
Rockford Map overruled the industrious collection doctrine, finding instead that it actually
affirmed the doctrine's viability. Clark Equip. Co. v. Lift Parts Mfg. Co., 32 Copyright L. Rep.
(CCH) P 20, 528, 530 (N.D. Il1. 1986). See also Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 683 F
Supp. 1204, 1207-10 (N.D. 11. 1988) (adopting Rand McNally l's holding that Rockford
Map did not repudiate earlier authority for copyright protection of factual compilations in a
white pages directory infringement case), aff'd, 905 F2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990). Clark held that
the Copyright Act expressly protects compilations and that the Seventh Circuit has therefore
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requirement that compilations constitute original works of authorship,
the Rand McNally III court instead relied exclusively on the industrious
collection doctrine as the basis for protection.
The Eleventh Circuit showed its own discomfort with the industri-
ous collection doctrine in Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Associated Telephone Directory Publishers.2 4 ' There, the court found the
Atlanta Yellow Pages to be a copyrightable work of original authorship
because of its subjective selection, organization, and arrangement of pre-
existing materials. Although the court discounted the substantial line of
cases relying on the industrious collection doctrine, it misinterpreted the
originality requirement since the arrangement and selection of data in a
typical Yellow Pages directory is mechanical and conventional, not
original, and although laborious, does not reflect the compiler's person-
ality. Moreover, notwithstanding its apparent rejection of the industrious
collection doctrine, the court expressly refused to reject the notion that
"the principle characterized as the 'sweat of the brow' theory is to apply
in a determination of originality under the act."24 Declining to choose
between a limited or more expansive standard of originality under the
Act, the court opined that originality should "be tested by the nature of
the selection and arrangement of the preexisting material in the compila-
tion ''14' and that "protection of original research of information in the
public domain is better afforded under an unfair competition theory. 246
5. Repudiation of the Industrious Collection Doctrine and the
Minimum Level of Originality Necessary for Copyright
Protection of Compilations
After the 1976 Act was implemented, most courts rejected the indus-
trious collection doctrine, 4 ' requiring instead that compilations contain
sufficient creativity in their "select[ion], coordinate[ion] or ar-
range[ment]" as to render them "original works of authorship" entitled to
copyright protection.2 48 The line, however, between mere labor producing
"recognize[d] and protect[ed] such industrious collections as well." Clark, 32 Copyright L.
Rep. (CCH) P 20, 531 (agreeing with Rand McNally III that industrious collection remains
valid) (alteration in original).
243. 756 F 2d 801 (11th Cir. 1985).
244. Id. at 809 n.9.
245. Id.
246. Id. See also Bellsouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g Inc., 719 F
Supp. 1551, 1557 (S.D. Fla. 1988) ("Although the Court prefers the 'selection, coordination or
arrangement' test, it is not clear which test the Eleventh Circuit adopted in Assoc. Tel. Directory.").
247. See, e.g., Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F 2d 569, 572-73 (9th Cir. 1987);
Fin. Info. Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv. Inc., 808 F 2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1986); Eckes v.
Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862 (2d Cir. 1984).
248. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2005).
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little or no originality and "intellectual labor" producing original and
newly created material can be very fine.
The basic problem with the industrious collection doctrine was that
it failed to incorporate the concept of originality, as understood in copy-
right law.249 Courts that rejected the industrious collection doctrine,
however, began to draw the line between "intellectual labor" and mere
unoriginal labor according to the fundamental principles underlying
copyright law. These courts understood that facts do not owe their origin
to the author who simply describes them. They also recognized that
originality is not only a constitutionally mandated requirement but also a
requirement that serves the important function of balancing the public's
interest in stimulating creative activity against the public's need for unre-
stricted access to information by allowing subsequent authors to build
upon and add to prior knowledge without unnecessary duplication of
effort. These courts therefore established a minimum threshold of origi-
nality, with an emphasis on "minimum," to deny copyright protection to
fact compilations that failed to exhibit some level of subjective arrange-
ment, thoughtful selection, or creativity.
The 1978 Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. Hamilton50 pro-
vided the first explicit rejection of the industrious collection doctrine.2
A Third Circuit decision from the 1950s had held that only those por-
tions of a map that were recorded by direct observation of the geography
described could be copyrighted. 52 The Hamilton court, however, found
this rule theoretically unsound and instead made clear that only original-
ity is the basis for a copyright:
Originality requires only that the work display "something irre-
ducible," which is one man's alone ... not that the work be
novel in comparison with the works of others.... When a work
displays a significant element of compilation, that element is
protectable even though the individual components of the work
249. See, e.g., 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 52, § 3.04 ("One who explores obscure
archives and who finds and brings to the light of public knowledge little known facts or other
public domain materials has undoubtedly performed a socially useful service, but such service
in itself does not render the finder an 'author.' ").
250. 583 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1978).
251. The defendant was charged with the counts of willful and knowing infringement of
a copyright in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 104. The defendant admitted making and selling repro-
ductions of a copyrighted map. The lower court found the defendant guilty and imposed a fine.
The defendant appealed on the grounds that the copyrighted map was not original enough
material to deserve copyright protection.
252. Amsterdam v. Triangle Publ'ns, 93 F Supp. 79, 82 (E.D. Pa. 1950), aff'd, 189 F.2d
104 (3d Cir. 1951).
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may not be, for originality may be found in taking the common-
place and making it into a new combination or arrangement.5 3
The Hamilton court further cited early cases recognizing that "'(t)he
elements of the copyright (in a map) consist in the selection, arrange-
ment, and presentation of the component parts! 1254
Explicit and direct rejection of the industrious collection doctrine
also appeared in the Fifth Circuit's Miller v. Universal City Studios,
Inc. 25 decision, in which the court held that research itself is merely an
alternative form of fact compilation and therefore also non-
copyrightable. In doing so, the court provided for the first time a full-
blown legislative, constitutional, economic, and policy-based analysis
repudiating the industrious collection doctrine. Comparing the collection
of facts to the compilation of names and addresses in a directory, the cir-
cuit court concluded that copyrightability for such a work rests "on the
originality of the selection and arrangement of factual material, rather
than on the industriousness of the efforts to develop the information.
'25 6
Lending protection to the industry of gathering facts or other non-
copyrightable material would essentially protect the material itself, in
violation of fundamental principles of copyright law.257
The court started its analysis with the idea/expression dichotomy,
explaining that it "derives from the concept of originality which is the
premise of copyright law.' 258 Originality, the court continued, is a consti-
tutional requirement, as illustrated by the Copyright Clause's use of the
word "Author.' 259 Facts, however, do not meet the threshold of originality
because:
253. Hamilton, 583 F2d 448, 451. See also Signo Trading Int'l Ltd. v. Gordon, 535 F.
Supp. 362, 364 (N.D. Cal. 1981) ("[O]riginality is lacking from Plaintiff's translations of the
single words and short phrases .... [Translation] may have involved considerable effort by
Plaintiff, but effort is not the touchstone of originality."); Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broad.
Sys. Inc., 672 F2d 1095, 1103 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[P]rotection is available ... for what he has
added to the component works, or for his skill and creativity in selecting and assembling an
original arrangement of those works, even if no new material is added.").
254. 583 F.2d at 452 (quoting Gen. Drafting Co. v. Andrews, 37 F.2d 54, 55 (2d Cir.
1930)). See also Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas., 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436).
255. 650 F2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated
Tel. Dir. Publishers, 756 F.2d 801,809 (11 th Cir. 1985).
256. Miller, 650 F.2d at 1369.
257. Id. at 1372. See also id. at 1370 ("[Hlowever difficult it may be to reconcile these
cases with the principle that facts are not copyrightable, the special protection granted directo-
ries under the copyright law has generally not been applied to other factual endeavors.")
(citation omitted).
258. Id. at 1368.
259. Id. (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). See also Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony, III U.S. 53, 58 (1884)).
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[A] fact does not originate with the author of a book describing
the fact. .... "The discoverer merely finds and records. He may
not claim that the facts are 'original' with him although there
may be originality and hence authorship in the manner of report-
ing, i.e., the 'expression,' of the facts." Thus, since facts do not
owe their origin to any individual, they may not be copyrighted
and are part of the public domain available to every person.260
Although the court was aware of the possibility of diminished incen-
tives to create databases, it understood that the only question at bar was
whether the copyright laws were intended to provide such protection.26'
Under the law, the only element of a compilation of facts that can be pro-
tected is the original selection and arrangement.262 Otherwise, directories
are a problematic breed that cannot be reconciled with the principle that
facts are non-copyrightable; the "mere use of the information contained
in a directory without a substantial copying of the format does not con-
stitute infringement. ' 63 Accordingly, the Miller court found the Second
Circuit's approach in Hoehling and Rosemont more in line with the pur-
pose and intended scope of copyright law:
The line drawn between uncopyrightable facts and copyrightable
expression of facts serves an important purpose in copyright law.
It provides a means of balancing the public's interest in stimulat-
ing creative activity, as embodied in the Copyright Clause,
against the public's need for unrestricted access to information.
It allows a subsequent author to build upon and add to prior ac-
complishments without unnecessary duplication of effort.
264
Another Second Circuit case, Eckes v. Card Prices Update,265 also re-
jected the industrious collection doctrine. Ignoring the economic
concerns about industry incentives, the court rested its holding squarely
on the "selection, creativity, and judgment" it found in the baseball card
guidebook at issue in the case.266 Although the Second Circuit found a
tension between the proposition that facts alone are not copyrightable
while a collection of them is, it resolved this tension by applying the rule
260. Miller, 650 E2d at 1368-69 (citation omitted).
261. Id. at 1369.
262. Id. at 1368.
263. Id. at 1369-70.
264. Id. at 1371-72.
265. 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984).
266. Id. at 863.
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that only original selection or creative arrangement may be protected.267
This solution was ultimately adopted seven years later in Feist.
26
1
The Ninth Circuit followed the steps of the Second Circuit in Eckes
in its 1987 decision Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co. 269 Worth is notable
for the minimal scope of protection it affords compilations of facts. It is
also instructive because of its endorsement of the original selection or
arrangement requirement27° and its reliance on cases disavowing the in-
dustrious collection doctrine.' In Worth, the Ninth Circuit permitted the
creators of the game Trivial Pursuit to use two volumes of Worth's copy-
righted encyclopedia as a source of factual information.7 Even though
the accused infringers appropriated approximately 4,000 of the encyclo-
pedia's 12,000 discrete entries the district court held that the scope of
Worth's copyright did not encompass the appropriated material.273 In af-
firming, the Ninth Circuit held that the discovery of a fact, regardless of
the quantum of labor and expense invested in that discovery, is simply
not a copyrightable work of an "author."274 Quoting from the Second Cir-
cuit's Eckes decision, the court made clear:
We ... cannot subscribe to the view that an author is abso-
lutely precluded from saving time and effort by referring to and
relying upon prior published material.... It is just such wasted
effort that the proscription against the copyright of ideas and
facts, and to a lesser extent the privilege of fair use, are de-
signed to prevent.275
267. Id. at 862 (" '[Tlhe very vocabulary of copyright law is ill suited to analyzing prop-
erty rights in works of nonfiction.' Indeed, while this court has recognized the 'distinction
between fact and expression is not always easy to draw,' we have been particularly restrictive
in the protection of non-fiction works... ) (citations omitted). See also Fin. Info., Inc. v.
Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., 751 F.2d 501, 510 (2d Cir. 1984)(Newman, J., concurring)
("[The] view that copyright protection should be extended solely because of laborious effort is
no reason for us to disregard the statutory criteria that Congress articulated in 1976 when it
enacted the current statute. The 'sweat of the brow' rationale is no substitute for meeting of
those statutory criteria."); Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 204, 207
(2d Cir. 1986)(finding creativity in selection and arrangement of factual work but stating that
granting copyrights based solely on labor in compiling facts "would risk putting large areas of
factual research material off limits and threaten the public's unrestrained access to informa-
tion").
268. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
269. 827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987).
270. Id. at 573.
271. Id. at 572-73.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 573.
275. Id. at 574 (citing Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310
(2d Cir. 1966)). See also Black's Guide, Inc. v. Mediamerica, Inc., No. C-90-0819, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16272, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 1990) ("It is clear from subsequent cases,
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In addition to these court decisions, the Copyright Office's registra-
tion practices during the years that preceded Feist are also informative.
In its report on legal protection of databases, the Copyright Office
outlined its registration practices during these pre-Feist years.276 One of
the primary roles of the Copyright Office is to register copyright claims
in works of authorship.2 77 Generally, the Copyright Office has always
applied an originality standard. Until the late 1980s, however, based on
the industrious collection doctrine it also registered compilations includ-
ing, but not limited to, telephone directories and other factual
databases.278 Such works, however, were registered under a "rule of
doubt"; when the Copyright Office had a genuine question about the
copyrightability of a work, the Office would make note of this doubt.279
This practice obviously stemmed from the fact that the case law at the
time simultaneously upheld both the industrious collection doctrine and
the 1976 Act's explicit originality standard.2 °
Beginning in 1987, however, the Copyright Office began to question
the copyrightability of works where the industrious collection doctrine
was the only basis for registration.2 1' By 1989, it had abandoned this
standard for most compilations, continuing to apply it only to works like
commercial telephone, street, and business directories and parts cata-
logues and inventory lists that were not "clearly de minimis" (a practice
that reflected the fact that some courts continued to uphold the copy-
rightability of such works based on the industrious collection
doctrine).282 Thus, database producers had fair warning that copyright
protection might not extend to the facts contained in their databases.
In light of this long, complex, and vacillating history of copyright pro-
tection of databases in the U.S., one must wonder whether the Supreme
however, that the rationale which was behind the Leon decision ... more recently has been
rejected, at least insofar as it involved the appropriation of labor and skill"); Cooling Sys. &
Flexibles v. Stuart Radiator, 777 F2d 485, 491 (9th Cir. 1985) ("An author can claim to 'own'
only an original manner of expressing ideas or an original arrangement of facts.").
276. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON LEGAL PROTECTION FOR DATABASES 29-38
(1997).
277. 17 U.S.C. §§ 410, 701(a) (2005). Although not a prerequisite to copyright protec-
tion, registration provides many benefits such as public notice, prima facie evidence of
copyrightability (17 U.S.C. § 410(c)), standing to sue for infringement (17 U.S.C. § 411 (a)),
better remedies for infringement (17 U.S.C. § 412), and priority in the event of conflicting
transfers (17 U.S.C. § 205). Therefore, many commercial copyright owners, including data-
base producers, regularly register their works with the Copyright Office.
278. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 276, at 32.
279. Id. at 30, 32-33.
280. Id. at 32.
281. Id. at 32-34.
282. Id. at 32, 34.
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Court really did "drop a bomb" '283 when it issued its decision in Feist. As
the discussion above shows, the legal landscape prior to Feist was much
more complex than what has been argued on either side of the Feist de-
bate. The pre-Feist courts' constant struggle over the industrious
collection doctrine set the stage for the Supreme Court's consideration of
the issue. The Supreme Court ultimately granted certiorari in a Tenth
Circuit case that applied the industrious collection doctrine to protect a
white pages telephone directory against wholesale copying.'
III. FEIST PUBLICATIONS INC. V RURAL TELEPHONE SERVICE Co.
A. Discussion of the Court's Decision
Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 281 is recognized as
the Supreme Court's first attempt to bring order to a very complex and
increasingly critical issue-the application of copyright law to factual
compilations. In Feist, the Court found a white pages telephone directory
to be non-copyrightable, holding that the sole standard for protection
under U.S. copyright law is creative originality. With this decision, a
unanimous Supreme Court sounded the death knell for the "sweat of the
brow doctrine," also known as the industrious collection doctrine. Al-
though, at face value, this decision clarified the law by invalidating these
doctrines as methods of applying copyright to factual compilations, this
clarification did not mean that copyright's treatment of factual compila-
tions became predictable or stable.
Feist involved the copyrightability of a white pages telephone direc-
tory. The plaintiff and respondent, Rural Telephone Service ("Rural"),
held a monopoly franchise on telephone service to a number of commu-
nities in Kansas. Pursuant to state law, Rural produced an annually
updated telephone directory that contained a typical white pages sec-
tion. 6 The defendant and petitioner, Feist Publication ("Feist"),
produced area-wide telephone books covering eleven different service
areas. Feist's directory overlapped with a portion of the area that Rural
serviced . 87
283. Denise R. Polivy, Feist Applied: Imagination Protects, But Perspiration Persists-
the Bases of Copyright Protection for Factual Compilations, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. ME-
DIA & ENT. L.J. 773, 782 (1998).
284. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 916 F2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990), cert.
granted, 498 U.S. 808 (1990), rev'd 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
285. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
286. Id. at 342.
287. Id. at 342-43.
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In preparing its directory, Feist licensed the use of the white pages of
ten of the eleven telephone companies whose listings it wished to dupli-
cate; only Rural refused to license its telephone listings. This refusal,
however, did not deter Feist; Feist simply took the desired portion of Ru-
ral's listings and incorporated it into its own directory.288 Rural
successfully sued Feist for copyright infringement, and the Tenth Circuit
affirmed. 89
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, presumably to resolve the
split that the circuit courts had found so troubling.2 ° The Court had two
options for resolving this conflict. It could either uphold the "sweat of
the brow" doctrine and extend meaningful protection to Rural or it could
apply the creative selection principle, derived from decisions such as
Sarony and Bleistein, and leave Rural with no effective protection
against competitors like Feist. Leaving Feist without protection, how-
ever, might be viewed as unfair and damaging to public policy. 9' Thus, if
the Court found for the defendant it would have had to square its doc-
trinal choice with notions of fairness and public policy. If the Court
decided for the plaintiff, it would have had to explain why it chose to
ignore its own well-established originality requirement. The Court chose
the former option-to endorse the creative selection approach.
The Court began by reviewing the history of copyright protection for
compilations and the development of the "sweat of the brow"/industrious
collection doctrines before unequivocally repudiating them. Originality,
the Court stated, must have two components: "independent creation plus
a modicum of creativity."'2 92 The Court noted, however, that the creativity
component is extremely modest. 3 The Court concluded that Congress
overruled the "sweat of the brow" doctrine, specifically requiring origi-
nality in order to protect compilations, as demonstrated by the newly
288. Id. at 342-44 (explaining that Feist's employers conducted additional research to
verify and augment Rural's listings but nevertheless reproduced four entirely fictitious listings
planted by Rural).
289. Id. at 344.
290. 498 U.S. 808 (1990).
291. One might argue that the "sweat of the brow" theory does not extend protection to
Rural because Rural expended no meaningful effort in assigning and printing the telephone
numbers of its customers. Since state law required Rural to publish its directory, the cost of
doing so was presumably built into the rates Rural charged its customers. Thus, denying copy-
right in this case would neither damage the incentives for producing telephone white pages nor
deprive Rural of a fair economic return. The Eighth Circuit, however, had previously rejected
such an argument. Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co. of Minn., Inc., 770 F.2d 128
(8th Cir. 1985).
292. Feist, 499 U.S. at 346.
293. Id. at 345 ("To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a
slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they
posses some creative spark, 'no matter how crude, humble or obvious' it might be.").
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introduced definition of "compilation" in the 1976 Act. 94 Thus, the ele-
ments of authorship that are protected in a compilation are only the
selection, coordination and arrangement of the underlying material.9
The Court explicitly reversed the minority of circuits that had adopted
the "sweat of the brow" doctrine and required second-comers to inde-
pendently collect material lest any substantial appropriation of a
copyrightable compilation to be an infringement29
This portion of the Court's opinion was really no more than well-
known doctrines and conclusions, representing the view taken by the
majority of circuit courts. The Court could therefore have simply just
applied the originality requirement (i.e. the creative selection approach)
to the facts of the case. The Court, however, chose a different path, per-
haps deciding that doctrine alone was an insufficient basis on which to
endorse the creative selection approach. The Court's holding therefore
went beyond statutory interpretation, stating that "[oiriginality is a con-
stitutional requirement" derived from the Copyright and Patent Clause's
references to "Writings" and "Authors.
2 97
But the Court went even further to dismiss concerns raised by
298"sweat of the brow" proponents. It recognized the possible unfairness
of failing to protect a compiler's labor but nevertheless stated that this
unfairness was simply not an issue: the failure to protect a compiler's
labor is "not 'some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme.' It is,
rather, 'the essence of copyright.' , 299 The Court reiterated that the policy
294. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2005) ("[A] work formed by the collection and assembling of
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that
the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.")
295. Feist, 499 U.S. at 356-58.
296. Id. at 349 ("This inevitably means that copyright in a factual compilation is thin.
Notwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler remains free to use the facts con-
tained in another's publication to aid in preparing a competing work, so long as the competing
work does not feature the same selection and arrangement.").
297. Id. at 346 (quoting U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8). The Court hinted, however, that
other forms of protection might not be subject to the same constitutional restriction. See id. at
354 ("Protection for the fruits of such research ... may in certain circumstances be available
under a theory of unfair competition.") (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.04 (1990)).
298. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-51.
299. Id. at 349 (citation omitted); see also id. (noting that "the primary objective of
copyright is ... '[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,'" and thereby provide
economic incentives for the production of socially beneficial works). Cf. H.R. REP. No. 60-
2222, at 7 (1909) ("Not primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of
the public, [copyright] rights are given .... "); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
464 U.S. 417 (1984):
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor
primarily designated to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is
a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to
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behind copyright was "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts,'"'3° thereby adopting the long tradition that copyright is meant only
to advance the public welfare and not to secure the rights of authors. The
creative selection approach thus correctly implemented copyright's pol-
icy of encouraging the desired production of factual compilations.3 °'
The Court then proceeded to explain how the "sweat of the brow"
doctrine could not coexist with the creative selection approach.3 2 It sug-
gested that courts that had adopted the "sweat of the brow" doctrine
simply misunderstood the copyright statute.3 3 The court specifically
pointed to the legislative history of the 1976 Act3 °' and the revision of the
definition of a "compilation" to require original authorship3 5 as evidence
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special
reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius ....
Id. at 429; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encourage-
ment of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through
the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' "); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPY-
RIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW & PRACTICE (1989); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Book, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 281 (1970); Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copy-
right, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 420 (1966); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL. STUD. 325 (1989); Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of
the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1989).
This, however, should not be taken as proof of the proposition that copyright is always best
explained or shaped as a matter of economic incentives. Many others decry the overwhelming
emphasis on economics in copyright, emphasizing the diverse and sometimes conflicting set
of values involved. See Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for
Principled Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV. 579 (1985); Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the
Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent and Encouragement Theory, 41
STAN. L. REv. 1343 (1989); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEo.
L.J. 287 (1988); Peter Jaszi, Towards a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Author-
ship," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455 (1991); Gary Kauffman, Exposing the Suspicious Foundation of
Society's Primacy in Copyright Law: Five Accidents, 10 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS. 381 (1986);
Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY. L.J. 965, 997-98 (1990); Yen, supra note 75.
300. Feist Publ'ns Inc., 499 U.S. at 349 (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
301. Id. at 350:
[The] principle, known as the idea/expression or fact/expression dichotomy, applies
to all works of authorship. As applied to a factual compilation, assuming the ab-
sence of original written expression, only the compiler's selection and arrangement
may be protected; the raw facts may be copied at will. This result is neither unfair
not unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright advances the progress of sci-
ence and art.
302. Id. at 353-54.
303. Id. at 352 (citing Leon and Jeweler's Circular).
304. Id. at 352-357.
305. See id. at 356 ("[The statute] defines a 'compilation' in the copyright sense as 'a
work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are
selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes
an original work of authorship' " (emphasis added by court) (quoting § 101 of the 1976 Act)).
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that the "sweat of the brow" doctrine was not relevant. Because of the
originality requirement, the court concluded, copyright protection is
never available for the facts themselves, but only for the original presen-
tation of those facts .
Having completed its attack on the "sweat of the brow" doctrine, the
Court concluded its opinion by applying the originality creative selection
requirement to Feist's compilation. According to the Court, Rural's case
hinged on whether Feist copied anything "original" from Rural, °7 which
the Court concluded Feist did not.
Understanding how and why the Court reached its finding of non-
infringement also uncovers its strong desire to rule on the creative selec-
tion and arrangement question. The Court began by identifying what
Feist copied from Rural, stating that Feist appropriated "1,309 names,
towns, and telephone numbers" from Rural's white pages.3 8 One might
then have expected the Court to proceed by analyzing whether Feist bor-
rowed any selection or arrangement °9 and therefore finding no
infringement because, as noted earlier, Feist borrowed Rural's underly-
ing material without its selection or arrangement."" Such a finding would
have been entirely consistent with its statement that "copyright in a fac-
tual compilation is thin."''
The Court did not do this. Instead, it apparently assumed that Feist
did take Rural's selection and arrangement,3 2 if only to reach for the
question of whether Rural's white pages selection and arrangement were
copyrightable." 3 The Court concluded that Rural's selection of listings
was "obvious," and its arrangement was "not only unoriginal, it [was]
practically inevitable,, 3t 4 explaining:
The selection, coordination, and arrangement of Rural's white
pages do not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for
copyright protection.... Rural's white pages are entirely typi-
cal.... In preparing its white pages, Rural simply takes the data
provided by its subscribers and lists it alphabetically by surname.
306. See id. at 358 ("Facts are never original, so the compilation author can claim origi-
nality, if at all, only in the way the facts are presented." (emphasis added)).
307. Id. at 361.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 361 (noting that Feist admitted that the directory as a whole was copyright-
able).
310. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
311. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349.
312. One could plausibly conclude that such an assumption was incorrect. See supra
note 287 and accompanying text.
313. Feist, 499 U.S. at 361-62.
314. Id. at 362-63.
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The end product is a garden-variety white pages directory, de-
void of even the slightest trace of creativity.35
However, the Court acknowledged that the telephone white pages were
an extreme case, falling into a "narrow category of works in which the
creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually
nonexistent,31 6 and that "the vast majority of compilations will pass" the
originality test.317
B. Analysis of the Decision
The Court's decision in Feist thus has three main components. The
first point was that compilations are not copyrightable solely because of
the time and effort needed to create them. However, this point, though
important, is hardly earth shaking. As the historical analysis in this Arti-
cle demonstrates, most circuit courts reached such a conclusion prior to
the Court's decision in Feist. In fact, only a small number of courts
granted copyright protection based on the "sweat of the brow," and this
protection was generally only granted to telephone directories and maps
alleged to be labor-intensive. The courts granting protection relied on
copyright law because they were moved by the equities of these cases,
although their reasoning fit better with the misappropriation doctrine
enunciated in cases such as International News Service v. Associated
Press.3 8 The second point in the Feist decision was that a second com-
piler does not infringe a copyright when using facts gathered by a first
compiler. This, however, was also unexceptional given the reality that
copyright law has never protected facts.
The last, and most important, point in the Court's analysis is that it
constitutionalized the originality requirement of copyright law. Although
it was clearly unnecessary to decide the case on constitutional grounds
since statutory grounds would have sufficed, the Court held that the
Constitution required a minimum amount of originality or creativity in
order for a work to be eligible for copyright protection. As the historical
analysis above showed, Feist was the first case to explicitly state that
originality is constitutionally mandated, though one could argue that the
Court's decision in Burrow-Giles suggested this implicitly.
Feist thus sounded the death knell for the "sweat of the brow" doc-
trine. One might even be surprised that it took the Court two hundred
years to arrive at such a fundamental decision given the many opportuni-
ties it had to explain the terms "Author" and "Writings." However, when
315. Id. at 362.
316. Id. at 359.
317. Id.
318. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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one examines the legal landscape and historical context within which
Feist was decided, one begins to understand why constitutionalization of
the originality requirement seemed necessary,3 9 even if Feist was not
necessarily the "best" factual scenario for establishing order and guid-
ance within the problematic field of compilation copyright.
Feist was decided in 1991, while major developments and break-
throughs in the fields of computers, telecommunications, and
information technologies, as well as the commercialization of the Inter-
net, were rapidly taking place. The opinion in Feist therefore both
reflected and signaled the beginning of a new era of coherence, one
which emphasized the constitutional dimensions constraining intellectual
property law doctrines. The opinion also reflected the great uneasiness
with the way the industrious collection doctrine allowed capture and en-
closure of facts, and signaled a shift away from the proprietary nature of
copyright in favor of dissemination of information and ideas.3 2 0 There-
fore, while the industrious collection doctrine might have been a
necessity in some situations during the era of pre-digital, old-fashioned
compilations, when database producers did not have the tools to other-
wise recoup their investment, Feist represented the realization that such
reasoning is inapplicable to modem electronic databases.
The constitutionally mandated originality requirement anticipated
and prevented the possibility that interest groups would try to checkmate
319. But see Robert Kreiss, Copyright Protection for Computer Databases, CD-ROMS
And Factual Compilations, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 323, 327 (1992) (addressing the possibility
that Congress's power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" could have been
interpreted to allow copyright protection to works of questionable originality to ensure works
that contribute to the "progress of science" are protected); Anat S. Narayanan, Note, Standards
of Protection for Databases in the European Community and the United States: Feist and the
Myth of Creative Originality, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 457 (1993-1994) (arguing
that the creative originality requirement is not constitutionally mandated); Leo J. Raskind,
Assessing the Impact of Feist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 331, 336 (1992) (arguing that Feist fails
to recognize that information gathering involves the exercise of judgment); Benjamin B.
Thomer, Copyright Protection For Computer Databases: The Threat of Feist and a Proposed
Solution, 1 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5 (1997) (arguing that Feist hampers incentives to bring func-
tional writings to the public); Russ VerSteeg, Sparks in the Tinderbox: Feist, "Creativity," and
the Legislative History of the 1976 Copyright Act, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 549 (1995) (arguing
that legislative history of the 1976 Act suggests "creativity" was not intended to be a required
element of copyrightability); Timothy Young, Casenotes, Copyright law: Copyright Protection
for Factual Compilations: The White Pages of the Phone Book Are Not Original Enough To Be
Copyrighted-But Why?, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 631 (1992) (arguing that Feist required more
originality than is congressionally mandated).
320. See Cable News Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Serv. of Am. Inc., 940 F.2d
1471, vacated, 949 E2d 378 (11 th Cir. 1991) (viewing Feist as revolutionizing the law of
copyright away from the proprietary nature of copyright, such that CNN had no copyright in
the news of the day, apparently including CNN's own news clips and reports). See also David
0. Carson, Copyright Protection for Factual Compilations After Feist: A Practitioner's View,
17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 969, 980 (1992).
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the public by pressing Congress to pass legislation protecting these
building blocks of knowledge. Indeed, almost all the database bills on
the database protection "problem" thus far failed mainly because they
could not withstand a constitutional challenge."' The Court thus
accurately envisioned challenges and technological advances that were
to come. The origins of the jurisprudence inherent in Feist, therefore,
necessarily lie in twentieth century achievements, rather than those of
the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, despite these important aspects of
Feist, the Supreme Court offered little guidance to the lower courts on
the question of creativity of compilations since it articulated the original-
ity standard in the weakest possible case, that of a white-pages directory.
Three notable problems result from this aspect of Feist.
First, in Feist there was neither real "sweat of the brow" nor free rid-
ing involved. Whereas in the past, creating a "white pages" directory was
a labor intensive mission, requiring many people with file cards to han-
dle, assemble, and check individual phone listings, today's phone
information is digital. Phone companies can quickly and easily create a
directory without much human input 32 by simply receiving the names
and addresses of all phone owners. Therefore, Feist did not really involve
"sweat of the brow" or human effort. Additionally, there was no free rid-
ing since Feist paid for the information it licensed from ten out of eleven
directories (and offered to pay Rural for the directory information) and
created a new productive work that was different from other directories
competitors offered.
The second problem lies in the fact that the data in Feist was gener-
ated by a government-created monopoly (Rural), which was required by
law to produce this information. Telephone companies such as Rural do
not, therefore really need incentives to create directories since these incen-
tives exist in the form of mandatory requirements to produce such
information as well as the possible revenue received from advertising.323 In
fact, even if no possibility of advertising revenue existed, consumers
would probably be willing to pay for the production of telephone books if
there was even a demand. It is interesting to note that Congress in the
Telecommunication Act of 1996 solved Feist's holdout problem regarding
321. See, e.g., John Tessensohn, The Devil's in the Details: The Quest for Legal Protec-
tion of Computer Databases and the Collection of Information Act, H.R. 2652, 38 IDEA 439
(1998) (examining H.R. 2652 and arguing that it must be overhauled to strike a balance be-
tween computer database publishers and the public).
322. Symposium, Panel I: Database Protection, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 275, 296 (2001).
323. Michael J. Schmelzer, Note, Protecting the Sweat of the Spider's Brow: Current
Vulnerabilities of Internet Search Engines, 3 B.U.J. Sci. & TECH. L. 12 (1997) (discussing
subscription, advertising, and enabling the purchase of goods and services as revenue models
for the web enterprises).
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telephone subscribers' information by requiring telecommunication car-
riers to provide non-discriminatory access to telephone numbers and
directory listings,3 24 thereby ensuring that such information is accessible
to others.
Finally, the Court in Feist dealt with the easiest type of directory
case-a white pages directory, organized in alphabetical order and lack-
ing minimal creativity. The nature of the case therefore made the need to
provide guidelines regarding creativity in compilations redundant, a fact
that has proven to be one of the major weaknesses of the decision. For
example, soon after the Court decided Feist, a series of cases emerged in
the federal circuit courts that seemed especially suited to follow from the
precedent set in Feist.3"5 However, the stability and clarity that the Court
seemed to promise in Feist proved to be short-lived3 26 : different circuits
examining cases with similar factual scenarios reached different results
when applying Feist.327 Thus, while the Court's decision in Feist did suc-
ceed in ending the split among circuit courts concerning "sweat of the
brow" versus creative selection/arrangement theory, the Court may have
ended up simply creating a new ambiguity by not providing further clari-
fication in the standards of originality it proclaimed.12 8 The result-
continued division and uncertainty regarding the copyrightability of
compilations.
CONCLUSIONS
The current debate over the legal protection of databases has lasted
for almost ten years. As this Article has shown, however, the debate has
failed to identify and discuss some of the most basic and preliminary
historical aspects of the issue. This Article has therefore sought to chal-
lenge these underlying assumptions by providing a fresh look at the
historical dimension of the debate.
Indeed, as can be seen from the more comprehensive review pro-
vided above on the history of informational works before the Court's
324. Telecommunication Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 222(e), 110 Stat. 56, 61,
62 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 222(e) (2005)).
325. See, e.g., Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991); Key Publ'ns, Inc.
v. Chinatown Today Publ'g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991); CCC Info. Servs., Inc.
v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 817
(1995).
326. Ethan R. York, Note, Warren Publishing, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp.: Continuing
the Stable Uncertainty of Copyright in Factual Compilations, 74 NOrRE DAME L. REv. 565
(1999).
327. See supra note 325.
328. Id. at 585. See also Tracy Lea Meade, Ex-Post Feist: Application of a Landmark
Copyright Decision, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 245, 251-52 (1994).
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decision in Feist, the law's prevailing approach has long been to support
unfettered access to facts and other materials considered indispensable
for academic, economic progress. In particular, the discussion showed
that the "sweat of the brow" doctrine had been in constant decline under
the 1976 Copyright Act even before the Court finally repudiated it in
Feist, clearly rebutting the commonly accepted argument that the Court
dropped a bomb when issuing its decision in Feist.
Based on this historical analysis it becomes evident that the actual
decision in Feist did not really establish any new law that would have
come as a surprise to the database industry. Instead, Feist simply re-
flected the prevailing approach of the time. Most importantly, however,
Feist reaffirmed the originality requirement and thus guaranteed the con-
tinued unfettered access to facts and information in a new and constantly
evolving information environment.
